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Ballot Propositions:* The Challenge of
Direct Democracy to State
Constitutional Jurisprudence
By JAMES M. FIsCHER**
Introduction
A review of recent literature and judicial decisions suggests that
we are seeing another "born again" phenomenon-a state constitu-
tional jurisprudence.' This conclusion, however, is incorrect. Al-
though state constitutional jurisprudence has been eclipsed in several
areas by federal constitutional jurisprudence, it never died. Notwith-
standing the federal shadow, state constitutional jurisprudence remains
a vibrant, viable area of legal enterprise and endeavor.2 State courts
have independently proceeded to develop many of the constitutional
standards that are commonly, though erroneously, believed to have
* Ballot Proposition is used here as a generic term to refer to both initiatives and
referendums. Initiatives are ballot propositions that are voter-initiated, whereas
referendums are legislature-initiated. In each case, the constitutional ballot proposition
requires majoritarian approval before it becomes effective. Moreover, since legislature-
sponsored referendums can hardly be seen as countermajoritarian, the origin of the ballot
proposition is of little significance when appraised regarding its effect upon state
constitutional jurisprudence.
** Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. J.D., 1973, Loyola Uni-
versity of Los Angeles. This is the product of a presentation delivered on January 8, 1983 to
the Constitutional Law Section of the American Association of Law Schools at the Associa-
tion's Annual Meeting in Cincinnati, Ohio.
1. Ironically, it was a 1977 article published in the Harvard Law Review by a United
States Supreme Court Justice that spurred popular attention toward reliance upon state con-
stitutions as a counterpoint to the federal Constitution. Brennan, State Constitutions andthe
Protection ofIndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 489 (1977). A bibliography of recent liter-
ature on the use of state constitutions can be found in Development of the Law-The Inter-
pretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1328 n.20 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Development].
2. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976). Indeed, it was the continued vibrancy of state constitutional
jurisprudences that, in part, inspired Justice Brennan's call for renewed attention to state
constitutions. Brennan, supra note 1. Justice Brennan also saw reliance upon state constitu-
tions as a means of offsetting what he perceived as reduced concerns on the part of the
Supreme Court for the protection of individual liberties. Brennan, supranote 1, at 495, 498-
500.
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originated in the Supreme Court. For example, state courts have de-
vised standards that guarantee separation of church and state in public
schools and protect interracial marriages from state negation.3 In
many respects, the Supreme Court has been more a follower than a
leader.4
State constitutional jurisprudence is influenced, however, by one
structural device not present in its federal counterpart: the ballot con-
stitutional proposition.' Amending the federal Constitution is an ardu-
ous task.6 Amending state constitutions is, by comparison, an everyday
occurrence.7 Development of a state constitutional jurisprudence oper-
3. See Howard, supra note 2, at 909-12; Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradi-
tion 82 YALE L.J. 227, 249 (1972).
4. See Linde, supra note 3, at 227, 248-51.
5. Voters enjoy the right of initiative in 23 states and in the District of Columbia. 125
CONG. REC. S1062 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). The states, with the
dates of their adoption of the initiative, are: Alaska (1959), Arizona (1911), Arkansas (1910),
California (1911), Colorado (1910), District of Columbia (1977), Florida (1968), Idaho
(1911), Illinois (1970), Maine (1908), Massachusetts (1918), Michigan (1913), Missouri
(1908), Montana (1906), Nebraska (1912), North Dakota (1914), Ohio (1912), Oklahoma
(1907), Oregon (1902), South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), Washington (1912), and Wyo-
ming (1967). Id Another three states employ the referendum but not the initiative. KY.
CONST. § 171 (referendum available only as to statutes classifying property for taxation);
MD. CONsT. art. XVI; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also Congressional Research Service,
Initiative Referendum and Recall 4 Resume of State Provisions, reprinted in Voter Initiative
Constitutional-Amendment, Hearings on SJ. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comn on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1977) (summarizing the
provisions of the states that currently allow for state constitutional amendment by ballot
proposition). Some of the ways in which the initiative process varies from state to state are
collected in Comment, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection,
71 CALIF. L. REv. 1216, 1217, nn.6-9 (1983).
6. See Weclew, The Constitution's 4mending Article: Illusion or Necessity, 18 DE PAUL
L. REv. 167, 168 (1968); see generally Linde, What in the Constitution Cannot be Amended?23
Aiuz. L. REv. 717, 720-22 (1981).
7. As of 1978, voters at the state level had approved 464 out of 1252 ballot proposi-
tions. Moreover, in the past decade the rate of use of ballot propositions has increased.
Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice
and the FirstAmendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 509, n.7 (1982). See also Comment, Cali-
fornia's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279 (1949) (noting that in a 70 year
period ending in 1946, 439 amendments were proposed to the California Constitution; of
those proposals, 246 were ratified).
State experience with state constitutional amendments can be compared with the 11
successful amendments (Amendments XVI to XXVII) and two serious, but unsuccessful
amendments (proposed Equal Rights Amendment and proposal to overrule Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)) to the federal
Constitution during the same time period (approximately 1900-78). Only four of the suc-
cessful amendments were directed at Supreme Court decisions: Amendment XI (1798), ne-
gating Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Amendment XIV (1868), negating
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Amendment XVI (1913), negating
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and Amendment XXVI (1971),
negating Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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ates under a regime of popular supervision that is not present at the
federal level. The role that popular supervision will play in the future
growth of state constitutional jurisprudence is the subject of this
Article.
Ballot constitutional propositions have not been used to advance a
consistent legal philosophy or legal order; rather, ballot constitutional
propositions generally represent reactions to singular or thematic de-
velopments in state constitutional jurisprudence. State constitutional
jurisprudence has been described as result-oriented.' It is not surpris-
ing that the product of a result-oriented jurisprudence may meet with
ad hoc majoritarian reaction and rejection. This Article reviews pres-
ent protections for state constitutional jurisprudence from majoritari-
anism, and discusses areas of law that could be developed to provide
additional safeguards.
A review of scholarly works, particularly those on the California
initiative process where use of the ballot proposition has been com-
mon,9 supports the conclusion that there are no practical legal con-
straints on the use of ballot propositions to effect changes in state
constitutional law. This is not to say that the federal Constitution does
not impose content constraints over popular supervision of state consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Nor does it suggest that ballot propositions are
an effective means of changing state law so that it mirrors majoritarian
views. Just the opposite is true. Federal law does impose content limi-
tations on ballot propositions, and majoritarian use of ballot proposi-
tions to change state constitutional law from that wrought by state
courts has been noticeably ineffective.
I. The Ballot Proposition Process
The ballot proposition process refers to the stages in which a prop-
osition is proposed, submitted to the voters, and popularly approved.
8. The instrumentalist or result-oriented jurisprudence is reviewed and critiqued in
Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1 (1982).
9. The California ballot proposition process has received most of the attention from
commentators. See Comment, Preelection Judicial Review. Taking the Initiative in Voter Pro-
tection, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1216 (1983); Comment, The Caif/ornia Initiative Process: A Sug-
gestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. Rv. 922 (1975); Comment, California's Constitutional
Amendomania, I STAN. L. REv. 279 (1949); Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitu-
tionalAmendments, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 461 (1980). The ballot proposition process of other
states has also been examined on occasion. See, e.g., Note, Initiative and Referendum--Do
They Encourage or Impair Better State Government? 5 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 925 (1977); Com-
ment, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1143 (1979);
Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. Rav. 175 (1979).
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This process is largely unfettered by state or federal constitutional limi-
tations. Popular supervision of state constitutional jurisprudence,
through the use of ballot propositions, has not been marked by mean-
ingful legal constraints upon the means employed to exercise that
supervision.
A. Limitations on the Amendment Process Arising Under State
Constitutions
State constitutions are marked by the looseness by which they can
be amended.'0 Some commentators have suggested that there are
structural reasons for this phenomenon." These commentators point
to functional differences between the federal Constitution and state
constitutions: the federal charter is identified as primarily concerned
with institutional arrangements; state constitutions are identified as
concerned with safeguarding all manner of grants and privileges to the
people. 12
The structural differences between the federal Constitution and
state constitutions are not meaningful. Institutional arrangements are
of fundamental concern to state constitutions.1 3 Any analysis of state
constitutions must begin by acknowledging the great diversity of state
charters. State constitutions vary significantly in length.' 4  Some, by
their attention to detail and minutia, contrast strongly with the federal
charter. Many states, however, have constitutions that parallel the fed-
eral charter by emphasizing the allocation of power rather than the
10. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Development, supra note 1, at 1355.
12. See, e.g., id What these commentators often overlook, however, is that the differ-
ences between the federal Constitution and state constitutions are often the result of ballot
propositions, rather than their cause. See Comment, California's Constitutional
Amendomania, supra note 7, at 280, "Qualitatively, even greater changes are made in the
Constitution by amendomania. The range of subjects covered is vastly enlarged. Although
the traditional constitution states only an outline of government andpolitical rights, the Califor-
nia Constitution now covers economic and social subjects as well. For example, some of the
matters commonly treated in amendments to the California Constitution are education, cor-
porations, public money, eminent domain, the Railroad Commission, counties, municipali-
ties, and prohibition." Id (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Ala. 1980) (legislative veto
power violated state constitution); Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d 95, 406
N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978) (degree of budget itemization required by New York Constitution is
not subject to judicial review); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950) (New
Jersey Constitution prohibits the legislature from overriding court rules by enactment of
statutes); State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408 (1928) (contempt order upheld
notwithstanding pardon by state governor).
14. For example, the Louisiana (201,000 words), New York (58,000 words) and Califor-
nia (45,000 words) Constitutions evidence a type of "superheavy" constitution.
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identification of fundamental or substantive rights. 15 The ease with
which a constitution may be amended appears to bear little relation to
its size or structure.
Early twentieth century progressivism is sometimes suggested as a
root cause for easy constitutional amendment by ballot proposition. 16
Distrust of "distant" legislatures, that were believed to be controlled by
special interests, caused citizens to call for a popular panacea--citizen
participatory democracy.' 7 Ironically, at least in California, there is a
history of ballot propositions being used to rectify "illiberal" state court
decisions rather than legislative decisions.18
Neither the validity nor the significance of the progressive pater-
nity is clear. Not all states with progressive traditions provide for bal-
lot propositions, and some states without progressive traditions do
provide for ballot propositions. In fact, there is a tendency to place too
much emphasis upon the progressive tradition and majoritarian conse-
quences of ballot propositions. Every constitution contains provisions
allowing it to be amended. 19 The most common method is legislative
sponsorship, followed by majority approval by the electorate. The use
of a process that bypasses the legislature hardly makes the matter more
or less majoritarian. It is the relative ease by which state constitutions
can be amended by a temporary majority that poses a challenge to state
constitutional jurisprudence, not the particular method by which
majoritarian views are implemented.
15. For instance, the New Jersey (12,000 words), Alaska (12,000 words), and Rhode
Island (6,500 words) Constitutions are similar to the federal document.
16. See generally E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1912); W.
DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910).
17. Wheeler, Changing the Fundamental Law, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION 56 (1961); see Comment, Calffornla'r Constitutional-4mendomania, supranote 9, at
282 ("The origin of amendomania in California lies principally in the Californians' histori-
cal distrust of their Legislature.").
18. See Comment, supra note 9, at 283; see generally V. KEY & W. CROUCH, THE INITI-
ATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 425, 432 (1939).
19. White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1132,
1133 (1952). Moreover, it is not always required that the prescribed method of changing the
constitution be followed. See Gatewood v. Mathews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 719-22 (Ky. 1966).
The court in Gatewoodreasoned that strict compliance to procedures prescribed by the Ken-
tucky Constitution was required only when the prescribed procedures were used. The proce-
dures were not, however, exclusive. Thus, where they were not used failure to comply with
them was irrelevant. The Gatewoodcase is inconsistent with several prior cases which had
required strict compliance with constitutionally prescribed procedures for amending the
Kentucky Constitution. Harrod v. Hatcher, 281 Ky. 712, 715, 137 S.W.2d 405, 407 (1940);
Arnett v. Sullivan, 279 Ky. 720, 721, 132 S.W.2d 76, 80, (1939) ("[C]onstitutions should
never be amended or disregarded.. . except in the manner pointed out in the constitution
itself. . . ").
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L Qual#fcation Requirements
In order to qualify a measure for consideration by the electorate, 20
proponents of the initiative ballot proposition must first draft the meas-
ure and submit it to state officials for review.2" This review is designed
to insure that the measure complies with state law regarding the topic
and format of ballot propositions. State officials also may title the
measure and prepare a summary of the measure's contents.22
Next, the necessary number of signatures to qualify the measure
for electorate consideration must be secured. The required number of
signatures varies from three percent to fifteen percent of the electorate;
the percentage is usually based upon the number of votes cast at the
last statewide election for a particular public office.23 Those individu-
als signing the petition to qualify the measure as a ballot proposition
must be currently registered voters.24 In addition, the requisite number
of signatures must be gathered within a specified time period.25
The measure's proponents then submit the signed petitions to state
officials for tabulation and verification. If the requisite number of sig-
natures has been obtained, the measure is assigned a proposition
20. The following discussion is drawn primarily from the California Election Code and
only applies to voter-sponsored ballot propositions (initiatives). Legislature-sponsored bal-
lot propositions (referendums) are not discussed. The legislature, in sponsoring ballot pro-
positions, must comply with qualification requirements applicable to that process. White,
supra note 19 passim, see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 9 (1956).
21. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3502 (West 1977).
22. Id This summary is used for the qualification process. A defective summary may
void the initiative. See Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 155-56 (Fla. 1982) (failure of
summary to disclose that stated chief purpose of proposed amendment was already subject
to statutory restriction rendered proposal clearly defective). After qualification, the propo-
nents of the ballot proposition may prepare a ballot pamphlet argument. Id at §§ 3503,
3530-33.
23. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-101 to 19-129 (1975 and Supp. 1980) (15% of
votes cast for Governor in last election); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3524 (West Supp. 1982) (8% of
votes cast for Governor in last election); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.371 (West Cum. Supp.
1980) (8% of votes cast for President in last election); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 10-8 to 10-
10.1, 16-6, 28-1 to 28-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (3% of votes cast for Governor in last
election); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, §§ 22A-22B, ch. 5513, §§ 4, 8-10 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1980) (3% of votes cast for Governor in last election). But see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 116.010-.340 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (8% of registered voters); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16-01-
11 to 16-01-11.2 (Supp. 1980) (4% of population). For a recent compilation of petition quali-
fication requirements, see Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Requirements
supra note 9, at 492-93.
24. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3516 (West 1977).
25. Id at § 3513 (150 days from the date California Attorney General returns proposed
ballot proposition, with title and summary, to sponsors). Where a qualification period is
prescribed by the state constitution, it cannot be altered by statute. State ex rel Citizens
Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1980).
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number and placed on the ballot for the next state-wide election.26 Al-
ternatively, a special election may be called to pass upon the ballot
proposition.27 It is at this pre-election point that challenges regarding
compliance with the formalities of ballot proposition qualification are
made.28 After the election, issues relating to petition qualification gen-
erally are treated as either mooted by the measure's defeat or "cured"
by the measure's passage.2 9
2. RatfMcation Requirements
The percentage of votes necessary to pass a ballot proposition var-
ies, as does the baseline against which that percentage is computed.
Percentage requirements run from fifty percent plus one to seventy-five
percent.30 The baseline also varies: one approach is to use the total
number of votes cast on the ballot proposition itself; another approach
is to use the total number of votes cast for a particular office, such as
governor.31 In the past, contests for elected office usually generated
more votes than did ballot propositions; hence, using the votes cast on a
26. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3500-30 (West 1977).
27. CAL CONST. art. II, § 8(c) (West 1954) (Governor may call special statewide election
for consideration of the ballot proposition).
28. See Comment, JudicialReview ofInitiative ConstitutionalAmendments, supra note 9,
at 469-74 (noting that challenges can be based upon (1) the form of the petition; (2) the
validity of the signatures; (3) the sufficiency of the circulator's affidavits; or (4) the propriety
of state action taken in connection with reviewing a petition's sufficiency or preparing a title
and summary). The qualification process itself may be subject to abuse, including the use of
"dodger cards" that cover up the approved ballot proposition summary with a more appeal-
ing statement, the use of false or misleading summaries, and the forging of signatures. See
Public Hearings on the Initiative Process Before the Caif/ornia Assembly Elections and Reap-
portionment Committee 2, 32, 48 (Oct. 10, 1972); see also Comment, Preelection Judicial Re-
view supra note 9, at 1217 (arguing for greater use of pre-election scrutiny of initiatives).
29. See, e.g., Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320,326-27, 187 P.2d 656, 659-61 (1947).
In some jurisdictions, qualification irregularities can be raised in a post-election challenge,
but the challenger bears a heavy burden of proof. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Nims, 316
Mich. 694,718,26 N.W.2d 569, 579 (1947). Several states have express constitutional limita-
tions on post-election challenges to the qualification of the ballot proposition. See, e.g.,
N.D. CoNsT. art. III§ 6. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional
Amendments, supra note 9, at 480-81.
30. N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1978 Pamp.) requires a three-fourths majority as a condi-
tion precedent to amendment of the state constitution. A further requirement that the
amendment also receive a two-thirds majority in each county was held unconstitutional in
State ex rel Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 688-89, 437 P.2d 143, 149-50 (1968)
because the requirement violated the "one man-one vote" standard of Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). See also ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (three-fifths of those voting on the
amendment or 30% of those voting in the election); NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 4 (majority of
those voting on the amendment and 35% of those voting in the election must vote on the
amendment); NEv. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 2 (voters must approve amendment twice).
31. See 26 AM. Jun. 2D, Elections, §§ 310-12 (1966); see also Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1382
(1941).
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particular office as the baseline made ratification difficult.32 Recently,
however, some ballot proposition contests have been generating more
votes; 33 consequently, ratification of ballot propositions has been easier.
Supermajority requirements for ballot proposition ratification have
been upheld,34 but it appears that the supermajority requirement itself
may be set aside by a simple majority vote.35
3. Ballot Proposition Constraints
a. Scope
Although ballot propositions can be used to amend a state consti-
tution, they cannot be used to revise a state constitution. For example,
in McFadden v. Jordan,36 the California Supreme Court declared inva-
lid a ballot proposition that would have repealed fifteen of the existing
twenty-five articles of the California Constitution and would have cre-
ated five new provisions. The line dividing an amendment from a revi-
sion, however, is neither clear nor defined.
In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board
ofEqualization,37 the California Supreme Court set forth a quantitative
and qualitative test to distinguish an amendment from a revision.
Under the quantitative test, a ballot proposition is deemed a revision
when its provisions are so extensive that they change directly a substan-
tial portion of the constitution by deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions. 8 Under the qualitative test, a revision occurs only
when the initiative accomplishes far-reaching changes that alter the na-
ture of the basic plan of government.39
Courts in other jurisdictions have approached the revision issue
differently. For instance, in a Florida case,4' a series of proposed
32. See generally Laughlin, A Study in Constitutional Rigidity I, IOU. CHI. L. REv. 142
(1943); Sears & Laughlin, A Study in Constitutional Rigidity I, 11 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 374
(1944).
33. SeeJ. NAISBITr, MEGATRENDS 181-94 (Warner Books ed. 1984). This has occurred,
however, when election for contested offices and ballot propositions were combined. Special
elections held only for the purpose of voting upon a ballot proposition may result in a sub-
stantially reduced voter turnout.
34. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
35. Opinion of the Justices, 263 Ala. 158, 81 So. 2d 881 (1955). See generaly 16 AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 29, 31, 38 (1979).
36. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. deniedsub nom. Allen v. McFadden, 336
U.S. 918 (1949).
37. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
38. Id at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
39. For example, under this qualitative test, a ballot proposition vesting all judicial
power in the legislature presumably would be considered a revision of the constitution.
40. Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1958).
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amendments were tied together so that all of the amendments had to be
approved or else all would be deemed denied. The court held that such
an arrangement constituted an improper attempt to circumvent the
prohibition against the revision of the state constitution by amend-
ment.41 Other courts have simply held that the terms "amendment"
and "revision" are synonymous.42
An offshoot of the principle barring revision by ballot proposition
is the single subject requirement.43 The objective of this requirement is
to prevent the adoption of a provision furthering an undesirable policy
solely because it is joined with another provision independently sup-
ported by voters. Although in California the single subject require-
ment is contained in the state constitution," the judiciary has been
responsible for determining the actual limits imposed by the require-
ment. California courts have interpreted the constitution liberally so
that few ballot propositions have been struck down under the single
subject requirement.
In California, a ballot proposition is deemed to comply with the
single subject requirement if its provisions are "reasonably germane to
each other and to the general purpose or object of the initiative. ' 45 In
41. Id at 504-05.
42. See Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 628, 33 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1945); State v. Taylor, 22
N.D. 362, 133 N.W. 1046 (1911).
43. The single subject requirement is quite common at both the statutory and constitu-
tional levels. See generally Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN.
L. Rav. 389 (1958); Comment, The Calfornia Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-
Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.L 1095 (1983) (criticizing the common, liberal application of the
single subject rule to legislative acts and initiatives).
Professor Lowenstein recently has presented an excellent analysis of the single subject
requirement as interpreted by the California Supreme Court. Lowenstein, Cahffornia Initia-
tives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983). Lowenstein argues that the
single subject rule should receive a liberal interpretation by the courts: "Viewing the single-
subject rule not so much as an instrument to correct some specific defect (e.g., voter confu-
sion) in the initiative process but rather as a reaffirmation of the original purposes of the
initiative process accords with both the understanding of the rule when it was enacted and
reenacted and the California Supreme Court's consistent liberal construction of the rule.
The initiative process was intended as a transfer of power from the legislature (and the
interests perceived as dominating the legislature) to the people at large. Because voters can
act collectively by means of the initiative process only episodically and at moments of high
political passion, the process is rarely used over narrow or technical issues. The initiative's
purpose was to provide an outlet for the public's dissatisfaction with the legislature's treat-
ment or nontreatment of an important and, in many cases, broad policy area. A narrow
construction of the single-subject rule that prevented such use would vitiate that purpose."
Id at 964 (footnotes omitted).
44. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, subd. (d) provides: "An initiative measure embracing more
than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."
45. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 245, 651 P.2d 274, 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35
(1982). See also Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 93, 207 P.2d 47 (1949) ("A provision which
Fall 1983"1 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
FPPC v. Superior Court,4" the California Supreme Court applied this
rule in reviewing a ballot proposition that prescribed certain political
reforms. The court held that the ballot proposition did not violate the
single subject requirement even though the proposition (1) created a
fair political practices commission; (2) created disclosure requirements
for election campaigns; (3) imposed election expenditure limitations;
(4) enacted conflict of interest rules; (5) placed limitations on lobbyist
activities; (6) imposed rules regarding ballot positions for election can-
didates and voter pamphlet summaries of arguments; and (7) specified
audit and sanction procedures in aid of the Act's enforcement.47
[contributes] to the act, or which is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose is ger-
mane within the rule."). Not all states follow the California interpretation. See, e.g.,
Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1978) (pro-
posed amendment must be functionally unitary). See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
46. 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
47. Id at 43, 599 P.2d at 51, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 860. In Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d
236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 48-
49, the court addressed the importance of FPPC v. Superior Court, thus: "Petitioners, sens-
ing the evident inconsistency between FPPC and their own present position, characterize the
FPPClead opinion as a mere 'plurality' opinion entitled to little weight. Yet six of the seven
justices in that case voted to sustain the multifaceted provision of the Fair Political Practices
Act against a single-subject attack. It was only Justice Manuel who dissented on this point.
His observations regarding the Act's multifarious character and his conceptual differences
with his six colleagues are very revealing for, in his view: 'The regulation of the election
process, no matter how broadly defined, has little to do with the regulation of the day-to-day
activities of lobbyists. The adoption of codes governing conflicts of interest in all state agen-
cies. . . is yet another matter. Although each of these might conceivably form a part of a
unified legislative program directed toward the policy objective of "political reform," each
concerns an entirely different and discrete subject.'
"If Justice Manual's characterization of the Fair Political Practices Act is accurate, and
if we are to follow our own precedent, our holding in FPPC necessarily controls the disposi-
tion of the present case, for on their face the various provisions of Proposition 8 certainly are
no less germane, interdependent or interrelated than the provisions of the statute which we
so recently sustained in FPPC against a similar single-subject attack.
"Petitioners argue that because Proposition 8 is designed to protect the rights of poten-
tial as well as actual victims of crime, its objective somehow thereby becomes too broad. Yet
surely the Fair Political Practices Act which we readily upheld in FPPC was subject to the
same criticism, for it too was aimed at protecting the general citizenry in their role aspoten-
ial victims ofpolitical corruption. Obviously, the fact that a multifaceted measure seeks to
protect the general public from harm (whether from present or future criminal acts, political
corruption or excessive taxation) presents no constitutional impediment to its validity.
"Petitioners speculate that the multiplicity of Proposition 8's provision enhanced the
danger of election 'logrolling,' whereby certain groupings of voters, each constituting numer-
ically a minority, but in aggregate a majority, may approve a measure which lacks genuine
popular support in order to secure the benefit of one favored but isolated and severable
position. Yet, as we emphasized in FPPC, such a risk 'is inherent in any initiative contain-
ing more than one sentence or even an "and" in a single sentence unless the provisions are
redundant. . . .'" Id at 250-51, 651 P.2d at 282, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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More recently, in Brosnahan v. Brown,48 the court examined a bal-
lot proposition that addressed such diverse subjects as school safety,
restitution by convicted defendants to crime victims, bail, diminished
capacity, rules of evidence in criminal proceedings, and plea bargain-
ing. The court found that each of the subjects had a common concern:
[T]he 10 sections were designed to strengthen procedural and
substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice system
... . Proposition 8 constitutes a reform aimed at certain fea-
tures of the criminal justice system to protect and enhance the
rights of crime victims.49
Thus, the single subject challenge was rejected and the proposition was
upheld.50
The court in both FPPC and Brosnahan did not require the spe-
cific matter contained in the ballot initiative to form an interlocking
package. In each case, the court allowed ballot propositions to address
comprehensively a variety of topics and still remain within the single
subject requirement. In general, it appears that most jurisdictions fol-
low this California approach."
It is questionable whether a loose single subject rule should be ap-
plied to ballot propositions adopted by initiative. In Brosnahan, the
majority placed considerable reliance upon Evans v. Superior Court.5 2
The California Legislature had enacted the entire Probate Code by a
single act. The act was challenged as violative of the single subject
requirement, then only applicable to legislation. The court in Evans
upheld the act:
Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly in-
dicated in the title, may be united in one act. Provisions gov-
erning projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a
single scheme may be properly included within a single act ....
The legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane
to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the field
of legislation suggested thereby.53
48. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
49. Id at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
50. Id at 253, 651 P.2d at 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
51. See, e.g., Fugina v. Donovan, 259 Minn. 35, 104 N.W.2d 911 (1960); Gottstein v.
Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595 (1915). But see Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984);
Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549 (1934). Colorado appears not to apply the single
subject rule to ballot propositions. People ex rel Elders v. Sour, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167
(1903).
52. 215 Cal. 58, 8 P.2d 467 (1932).
53. Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62-63, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (1932) (emphasis ad-
ded). (citations omitted).
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Although the Brosnahan majority did not distinguish between bal-
lot propositions and proposed legislation insofar as application of the
single subject requirement is concerned, such a distinction should be
made. Ballot propositions should be subjected to a more rigorous ap-
plication of the single subject requirement because they are not re-
viewed to detect internal inconsistencies, conflicts with existing law, or
dubious factual, political, or policy assumptions;54 in addition, ballot
propositions often are poorly drafted and complex." The legislative
process, on the other hand, is designed to provide review of proposed
legislation through staff analysis, public hearings and legislative de-
bate.5 6 It should therefore be expected that legislative originated meas-
ures can better sustain lenient application of the single subject
requirement.5 7
54. See Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 988 (Fla. 1984) ("We recede from our prior
language in Floridians [Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 237 (Fla.
1978)] that expressed the view that there is no difference between the legislative one subject
restriction and the initiative constitutional one subject limitation. We find it is proper to
distinguish between the two." The court based its distinction on three grounds: 1) Florida
statutory single subject language is broader than constitution single subject language; 2) leg-
islative proposals must proceed through legislative debate and public hearings; and 3) strict
compliance should be required when amendment of basic charter of government is
involved.").
55. California's recent propositions have inspired a number of critical commentaries
deploring the vagueness and poor drafting in propositions. See, e.g., Paltrow, New Anti-
Crime Law in California [Ballot Proposition 81 Is Helping Some Accused Felons, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Hamilton, California's Sloppy Ballot Measures-Bad Drafting
Made Proposition 13's Intent Anyone's Guess, L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1982, § 3, at 9, col. 1.
56. See Note, The California Initiative Process, supra note 9, at 930-34 (discussing dif-
ferences between drafting of initiative and legislative proposals). Cf. City of Raton v.
Sproule, 78 N.M. 138, 142, 429 P.2d 336, 340 (1967) ("Logic and reason compel that a like,
or even stronger, presumption must prevail in favor of the validity of a constitutional
amendment which has received both legislative approval and approval of the [voters].").
57. Professor Lowenstein argues to the contrary. He contends that the arguments of
complexity and logrolling are overstated. Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 954-63. He also
contends that use of a stringent single subject test would work a serious infringement upon
the right of initiative. Id at 965.
Professor Lowenstein's objections are well aimed and well reasoned. His conclusions
and criticisms, however, are linked inextricably with his own laudable efforts with the initia-
tive to establish California's Fair Political Practices Commission. Id. at 936, 965 n.l 15 (re-
counting Professor Lowenstein's role). The law should not be predicated upon an
assumption of altruistic tendencies by those involved in the political process. Professor
Lowenstein also fails to give due weight to ballot complexity. See infra note 120 and accom-
panying text. Whatever deficiencies legislators may have regarding their abilities to evaluate
complex materials, they at least have the benefit of staff and institutionalized procedures to




State constitutions generally do not restrict the subject matter that
may be addressed by ballot propositions. A few state constitutions do
contain subject matter restrictions, such as prohibitions against the use
of ballot propositions on issues involving religion, judicial appoint-
ments, the reversal of judicial decisions, and guarantees in the state's
Bill of Rights." In addition, some states prohibit the reintroduction of
a subject by ballot proposition until a prescribed period of time has
elapsed since that subject was last presented to the electorate by ballot
proposition.59
In Brosnahan,60 the California Supreme Court implicitly extended
to state constitutional ballot propositions a limitation that previously
had been applied only to local initiative or local referendum measures
affecting government at the municipal level.6' Under this limitation, a
ballot proposition cannot work an impairment of essential government
functions.62 If a ballot proposition will "'greatly impair or wholly de-
stroy the efficacy of some other governmental power, the practical ap-
plication of which is essential,' "63 that proposition is invalid.64 Despite
this general test, the contours of the limitation are difficult to discern.
The propiety of applying the rule prohibiting impairment of essen-
tial services to statewide constitutional ballot propositions is suspect.
The doctrine was first articulated in Chase v. Kalber,65 a case involving
a local ballot proposition's effect on a state plan for street improve-
ment. In denying efficacy to the local ballot proposition, the court fo-
cused on the conflict between that ballot proposition and the state plan
for street improvement:
It is plainly apparent that no part of the proceedings in street
improvement could be subjected either to the initiative or refer-
endum without completely destroying the right of property own-
ers whose property is to be affected by such proceedings to be
58. See, e.g, MASS. CONST. of 1970 art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 3. Illinois restricts initiatives to
matters addressing the composition, duties, and powers of the legislature. ILL. CONST. art
XIV, § 3; see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-704.1 (1978) (no appropriation by initiative). It is
sometimes argued that matters proper to statutory enactment cannot be made part of a
state's constitution. See, eg., State ex rel Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689
(1910). The strength of that argument, however, is unclear.
59. See, e.g., NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 2; PA. CONST. art XI, § 1; cf Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d
314 (1965).
60. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
61. Id at 258, 651 P.2d at 287, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
62. Id
63. Id (quoting Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 134, 222 P.2d 225, 230 (1950)).
64. Id at 258-60, 651 P.2d at 287-89, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 43-45.
65. 28 Cal. App. 561, 153 P. 397 (1915).
Fall 1983] BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
heard upon the question whether the proceedings, when first in-
augurated, should be suspended for the period of six months, as
provided by the street law, or upon the question whether the as-
sessment is erroneous or valid or not valid.6 6
Based upon this conflict, the court set forth its views regarding impair-
ment of essential services.67 It appears, therefore, that the court in Kal-
ber did not rely on the "no impairment" concept as an independent
basis for nullifying the ballot proposition; instead, the rule can be seen
simply as a gloss upon a preemption-oriented analysis designed to re-
solve conflicts between state and local law.68
The Kalber gloss was later uncritically incorporated into the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Simpson v. Hie.69 Simpson in-
volved a county ballot proposition that would have prevented a local
board of supervisors 7 0 from designating a site for court buildings. As a
practical matter, the ballot proposition would have interfered with the
county's obligation under state law to provide quarters for the court in
the county. The precise legal question before the court, however, was
whether the county action being challenged by the local ballot proposi-
tion-the designation of a suitable site for court buildings-was a legis-
lative act as opposed to an administrative or judicial act. Under
California law, only legislative acts were subject to local initiative or
66. Id. at 573, 153 P. at 402.
67. Id. at 574, 153 P. at 402.
68. Id at 574-75, 153 P. at 402. Further support for this narrow view of the "no impair-
ment" doctrine is provided by the court's reliance in Kalber upon J. DILLON, TREA'ISE ON
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). Id at 576, 153 P. at 403. Dillon was a
staunch opponent of local autonomy and developed a thesis predicated upon city powerless-
ness. This thesis received support from the intellectual and scholarly communities during
the early twentieth century. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057,
1109-1115 (1980) (Dillon's thesis involving state control of cities, restriction of cities to "pub-
lie" functions, and strict construction of city powers was largely accepted).
Several California cases recognize that the true concern in this area is the proper work-
ing relationship between state and local government. See, e.g., People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board
of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 872, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669 (1973) (where state zoning
ordinances require public notice and hearing, local zoning initiative is invalid); Mervynne v.
Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 562, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1961) (local proposition to repeal
parking meter ordinances invalid where proposition would interfere with state scheme dele-
gating power over parking meters and traffic control to local government); see also Associ-
ated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976) (distinguishing "those decisions which bar the use of the
initiative and referendum in a situation in which the state's system of regulation over a
matter of statewide concern is so pervasive as to convert the local legislative body into an
administrative agent of the state. .. ").
69. 36 Cal. 2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950).
70. Under California law, the board of supervisors is the governing body of a county.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4(a).
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referendum.71
The court in Simpson held that designating suitable court build-
ings was not legislative and hence not properly addressed by ballot
proposition.72 The rule proscribing impairment of essential govern-
ment services was not asserted as an independent ground for the deci-
sion but as an example of the evils that would result if ballot
propositions were allowed to usurp administrative functions properly
delegated to local bodies by the state.73 The court nevertheless set forth
the "no impairment" doctrine in black letter terms, largely disregarding
the doctrine's limited application in Kalber.74
It makes sense to invalidate county or municipal ballot proposi-
tions that impair essential government functions; by doing so, courts
can help maintain the necessary equilibrium in the working relation-
ship between local government and the state. A critical function of a
state constitution is to delineate the appropriate balance of power be-
tween the state and its political subdivisions (cities, counties). The bat-
tles for power between the state and its political subdivisions are
similar to the conflict that exists between any central government and
the decentralized governmental organs that exercise political power at
the local level. Some state oversight to assure fidelity to the state or-
ganic law, which sanctioned the local entity, is no doubt proper. That
concern, however, should not be facilely extrapolated to state ballot
propositions.75
If the state judiciary is nonetheless going to apply the "no impair-
ment" test, it is helpful to determine the scope of the test. In addressing
the "no impairment" issue, the court in Brosnahan emphasized the no-
tion of "inevitability" as the key criterion. Unless the impairment is
71. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d at 129, 222 P.2d at 228 (1950). The distinction is often difficult
to make. In general, the focus is functional. If the matter is of statewide concern and the
decisionmaking authority has been delegated to local government, the function is character-
ized as "administrative"; conversely, if the matter is of local concern, the function is charac-
terized as "legislative." See Hughes v. Lincoln, 232 Cal. App. 2d 741, 744-45, 43 Cal. Rptr.
306, 309 (1965).
72. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d at 130-31, 222 P.2d at 228-29.
73. Id at 133-35, 222 P.2d at 228-29.
74. Id at 133, 222 P.2d at 230-31.
75. It has been argued'that the constitutional ideal of a republican form of government
may provide principled support for the thesis that essential functions of the state cannot be
impaired. Cf. Sirico, The Consttutionality of the Initiative and the Referendum, 65 IoWA L.
Rav. 637 (1980): "When a locality chooses some form of representative governance, it
should attend to the state and federal paradigms mandated by the Constitution. In structur-
ing local decisionmaking, it should consider the wisdom of republican dominance and act
accordingly. Conversely, the lessons to be gleaned from studying local plebiscites should aid
in evaluating these mechanisms at the state level." Id at 658 (footnotes omitted).
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inevitable and certain, without reference to speculation or assumption,
the "no impairment" limitation will not apply.76 It should be noted
that the court in Brosnahan was careful to couch its holding in terms
that addressed only the "facial" challenges to Proposition 8. 7 7 Consid-
eration of the potential problems associated with Proposition 8-partic-
ularly the effect on the criminal justice system of the ban upon plea
bargaining-was deferred because such problems were only specula-
tive. The court left open the question of whether the "no impairment"
limitation would apply if the problems forecast by the opponents of
Proposition 8 in fact materialized.7 8
76. 32 Cal. 3d at 258-60, 651 P.2d at 287-88, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.
77. 32 Cal. 3d at 258-60, 651 P.2d at 287-88, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44. The majority's
focus upon the conjectural quality of the petitioner's forecasts concerning the consequences
of Proposition 8 emphasizes that the critical point was the timing of petitioner's arguments.
Id.
78. The court in Brosnahan also avoided deciding the specific quantum of "impairment
that must be found before a ballot proposition will be struck down under the "no impair-
ment" doctrine. Some insight may, however, be provided by the court's reference to Simp-
son, 36 Cal. 2d at 125, 222 P.2d at 225, discussed supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text,
as an example of the "successful" use of the "no impairment" doctrine to nullify a ballot
proposition. At the state-wide level, a ballot proposition would have to interfere seriously
with state government before the limitation could be invoked. It is difficult to envision such
a situation arising; something akin to paralysis of state government or an essential govern-
ment function, such as public safety, seems to be required. Under such circumstances, the
state constitution itself may prevent an "interpretation" of a ballot proposition that would
result in state paralysis. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (guaranteeing the right to pursue
and obtain "safety").
Thus, in order to "impair essential government functions," it appears that a ballot prop-
osition must negate specifically an existing constitutional guarantee and must, by its terms,
require that the paralytic act be undertaken. In such a situation, it seems safe to presume
that a court would go to great lengths to avoid interpreting the ballot proposition as requiring
such a construction. Cf. Chass v. Kalber, 28 Cal. App. 561, 569-70, 153 P. 397, 400 (1915):
"This conclusion follows from the conviction, to which re-examination of the vital question
involved herein has unavoidably led us, that the powers referred to and the system estab-
lished by the legislature for the improvement of public streets cannot coexist, if it be true
that the former are applicable to the latter. This proposition, it is true, is to be considered
only in aid of the ascertainment of the intention of the people as to the scope of those powers
or of determining whether they intended certain limitations in the exercise thereof or that
certain acts of a legislative character should not be made amenable thereto. For, in examin-
ing and ascertaining the intention of the people with respect to the scope and nature of those
powers, it is proper and important to consider what the consequences of applying it to a
particular act of legislation would be, and if upon such consideration it be found that by so
applying it the inevitable effect would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of
some other governmental power, the practical application of which is essential and, perhaps,
as in the case of the power to compel the improvement of streets, indispensable, to the con-
venience, comfort and well-being of the inhabitants of certain legally established districts or
subdivisions of the state or of the whole state, then in such case the courts may and should
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The Brosnahan decision did not resolve the issue of whether the
"no impairment" doctrine represents a substantive common law restric-
tion upon the people's right to amend the state constitution. If the "no
impairment" concept is accepted as a nonfederal independent doctrine,
parts of a state constitution would be immune from popular reevalua-
tion by ballot proposition. Such a result is politically unacceptable.
On the other hand, if the "no impairment" doctrine is accepted but
linked to state law, it will likely be used only as a rule of construction.
If the "no impairment" doctrine is employed as a rule of construction,
those individuals supporting a ballot proposition that impiirs govern-
mental functions should bear a heavy burden of proof.79
B. Limitations on the Amendment Process Arising Under the Federal
Constitution
A state ballot proposition that violates a specific federal norm is
invalid. 0 Thus, a state ballot proposition that sought to permit police
conduct inconsistent with Mapp v. Ohio "' or Miranda v. Arizona,82
prosecutorial conduct inconsistent with Brady v. Marylands3 or state
administrative action inconsistent with Brown v. Board of Education,8 4
would not be sustained. 85 The problem of the contravention of specific
federal constitutional norms is not addressed here. Rather, this section
examines whether there are general federal constraints upon the use of
assume that the people intended no such result to flow from the application of those powers
and that they do not so apply."
79. See supra note 68; see also Hunt v. Mayor of Riverside, 31 Cal. 2d 619, 628, 191 P.2d
426, 431-32 (1948) (if applying referendum power would have the inevitable effect of greatly
impairing the efficacy of some other essential governmental function, it must be presumed
that the people did not intend such a result).
80. SeeAFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P.2d 912, 916 (1948), aft'd,
335 U.S. 538 (1948); see generally 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 71 (1971) (collection of
cases); see infra note 85.
81. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment re-
straints on searches and seizures is not admissible in state criminal prosecutions).
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (if a person is not advised of certain rights prior to custodial
interrogation, statements elicited may not be used by the state in a prosecution against that
person).
83. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (exculpatory evidence known by state must be disclosed to
defendant).
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing racial segregation accomplished by pupil
assignment).
85. State law adopted by ballot proposition is subject to federal constitutional con-
straints. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (voter-approved Oregon ballot proposition, which would require that par-
ents send their children to public school, nullified on grounds that it was inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980)
(state constitution treated as state statute for purposes of exercising appellate jurisdiction
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ballot propositions that are designed to or have the effect of limiting
state constitutional jurisprudence.
Initially, it is necessary to determine what is meant by "state con-
stitutional jurisprudence." If an extremely broad definition is adopted,
every ballot proposition addressing a problem previously looked at by
a state court would be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. This result is not
intended. Rather, the focus here is upon the growing number of state
court decisions defining constitutional rights more generously and pro-
viding more protection of those rights than the federal Constitution re-
quires, at least insofar as the Constitution is interpreted by the current
Supreme Court. In this body of law, state courts have defined due pro-
cess,86 equal protection," cruel and unusual punishment,86 pniva-
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976)). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
When contending that a state law is invalid because it conflicts with federal law, liti-
gants should not limit their arguments to the federal Constitution. The Supremacy Clause
makes all federal law supreme to state law. Particularly in civil rights cases, the developing
international human rights law may, through its restatement as federal common law, apply a
content based limitation upon ballot propositions. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980) (law of nations is part of federal common law).
86. See, e.g., State v. Vernon, 385 So. 2d 200, 204 (La. 1980) (state constitution requires
that Miranda waiver be shown by proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by proof
under the more lenient preponderance standard required by the federal Constitution, citing
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)). Similarly, in State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d
802 (1983), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected claims that the state based exclusionary rule
was based upon "deterrence" considerations and thus subject to a "good faith" exception.
This ruling could prove particularly important if the United States Supreme Court recog-
nizes a "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in one of the two
cases recently before the Court involving that issue. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass.
488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983), rev'd and remanded 52
U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S. July 5, 1984); United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535, rev'd52 U.S.L.W. 5155 (U.S. July 5, 1984).
87. See, e.g., Darin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (declaring unconsti-
tutional a state high school association bylaw prohibiting girls from competing in interscho-
lastic sports). In Darin, the Washington Supreme Court required greater justification to
validate gender-based discrimination than that required by strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 871, 540 P.2d at 889. Subsequently,
in Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 239, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976), the court suggested
that the court in Darin had created "an absolute prohibition against discrimination based
upon sex." (emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Assoc., 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (1975); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d
1, 17-20, 485 P.2d 529, 539-42, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-42 (1971) (sex is suspect classification
under state constitution equal protection provision). See generally Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. RaV. 873 (1976).
88. See, e.g., State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980) (en banc) (recidivist
statute found to violate state constitution bar against cruel and unusual punishment). See
generally Development, supra note 1, at 1383-84.
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cy, 89 and other rights,9° thereby imposing increased restrictions upon
the exercise of state power. Are there any general federal constraints
upon the use of ballot propositions to limit or even reverse the growth
of that jurisprudence?
Z The Guaranty Clause
By article IV, section 4 of the Constitution, the federal government
guarantees to each state in the Union a republican form of govern-
ment.91 Two questions capture the relevance of the Guaranty Clause
to ballot propositions. To what extent, if any, is direct citizen par-
ticipatory democracy in the form of ballot propositions inconsistent
with a republican form of government? Is the Guaranty Clause
designed and intended to block majoritarian excesses, such as the use
of ballot propositions to disable state constitutional jurisprudence sup-
porting disfavored groups in society?92 The answer to both of these
questions apparently is no, at least insofar as it may be argued that a
judicial remedy is available under the Guaranty Clause.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has treated the issues
raised by the Guaranty Clause as political in nature and perforce com-
mitted to one of the other coordinate branches of government for reso-
89. See generally Development, supra note 1, at 1430-43 (discussing cases). Nine state
constitutions make protection of privacy explicit. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (by initia-
tive); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; see Development, supra note I, at 1430 n.5 (listing states).
90. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625
P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (applying state constitution to enjoin abortion funding
restrictions). Notwithstanding Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion funding limi-
tation constitutional), fifteen states and the District of Columbia fund abortions out of state
revenues. About 80% of all abortions in the United States are performed in those jurisdic-
tions that provide funding. The Issue That Won't Go Away, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1983, at 3 1.
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." See generally W. WIECK, THE GUARAN-
TEE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1972); Bonfield, he Guarantee Clause
f0rticle IV, Section 4:A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 516-30
(1962).
92. Cf. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated- Warth v. Seldin andCity of Eastlake v. For-
est City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373 (1978) (due process requires that certain
types of decisionmaking be made by deliberative governmental bodies rather than by major-
itarianism). "The claim [for requiring decisionmaking by a deliberative governmental body]
seems quite strong when two conditions are met: first, where substantial constitutional val-
ues are placed in jeopardy by the enactment at issue; and second, where substantive review of
the enactment by the judiciary is largely unavailable and hence cannot secure these constitu-
tional values." Id at 1418.
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lution.93 The Court's seminal Guaranty Clause decision is Luther v.
Borden,94 a case involving a claim that one of two contending govern-
ments of the State of Rhode Island was a nullity.95 Unable or unwill-
ing to define the dimensions of a "republican form of government" for
purposes of selecting between the contenders, the Court deferred to
Congress.96 In a later case, Paciic States Telephone & Telegraph v. Ore-
gon,97 the Court followed its decision in Luther and held that an issue
of this type must be committed to Congress for resolution.9" Paclc
States is an important case on its facts because it involved the conten-
tion that the use of the initiative process-rather than the content of the
initiative-violated the Guaranty Clause.99
Despite the Supreme Court's decisions in Luther and Pacofc
States, it appears that claims under the Guaranty Clause may be justi-
ciable where the violation of the republican norm is clear-l°° Obvi-
93. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,556 (1946); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron
Metropolitan Power Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930).
94. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
95. The rival factions in Luther based their claims upon different state constitutions.
The entrenched government derived its claim from the 1633 CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS. This Charter, limited the right to vote and contained no provi-
sion for amendment; it had been retained as the state constitution in 1776, Thus, as noted by
Wieck, "[i]n 1842 Rhode Island was in the anomolous position of being the only state in
which the people had not drafted or ratified their own constitution." W. WIECK,, supra note
91, at 86. An attempt was made in 1842 to change this situation. Those dissatisfied with the
status quo unilaterally elected a constitutional convention by universal male sufferage (en-
lightenment had its limits in 1842). The convention drafted a new constitution that was
subsequently adopted by a majority of the adult male population. Bonfield, supra note 91, at
534. Initial efforts to establish the new government by force-of-arms failed. Id The chal-
lengers then turned to the courts by bringing an action in trespass. The gist of the action is
described by Bonfield: "The case which developed out of this incident was an action of
trespass brought by Martin Luther against Luther Borden and others. The defendants main-
tained that the 'Charter Government' had declared martial law due to the insurrection just
described. After further alleging that Luther had been involved in the insurrection, defend-
ants concluded that as members of the militia they had rightfully broken into his house to
arrest him. Luther answered by contending that prior to the alleged trespass the 'Charter
Government,' under whose authority Borden had acted, had been displaced and annulled by
the people of Rhode Island. Therefore, his actions at that time were in support of the lawful
authority of the state, while Borden was in arms against it." Id (footnote omitted). The
fascinating history of Luther v. Borden and the political significance the decision had in
America in the 1840's is discussed with great care by W. WIECK,, supra note 91, at 86-129.
96. Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
97. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
98. Id. at 143, 151.
99. The Court, however, failed to address this contention because of its holding on the
justiciability issue.
100. See Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 985 (E.D. La. 1968), af'd 393 U.S. 531
(1969) (Wisdom, J., concurring): "The line of judicial development of the republican guar-
antee, bent and broken since Luther v. Borden, is not beyond repair. Some day, in certain
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ously, a standard of this type lacks any pretensions of certainty; it does,
however, allow federal courts to interdict egregious violations of the
republican norm.10' Federal courts, however, have been reluctant to
invoke the Guaranty Clause because it is identified with the political
question doctrine. As a result, Guaranty Clause issues in federal court
have been transformed into procedural, justiciability wrangles. State
courts not encumbered by the justiciability doctrinal concerns, have
proved generally more willing to consider such Guaranty Clause
issues. 10 2
circumstances, the judicial branch may be the most appropriate branch of government to
enforce the Guaranty Clause. Federal courts should be loath to read out of the Constitution
as judicial, nonenforceable a provision that the Founding Fathers considered essential to
formulation of a workable federalism." (footnote omitted) (emphasis original).
The dogmatism of the Supreme Court's statement in Luther regarding the justiciability
of the "republican form of government" guarantee might be considered to have been implic-
itly softened by the Court's reference to the "legitimacy" of the question raised in Luther
"'It was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guarantee belonged to the political
department.' Luther x Borden, 7 How. 1. In that case it was held that the question, which of
the two opposing governments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or the gov-
ernment established by a voluntary convention, was the legitimate one, was a question for
the determination of the political department; and when that department had decided, the
courts were bound to take notice of the decision and follow it .... " Pacific States Tele-
graph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149 (1911).
101. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1961) (Guaranty Clause may be invoked
in the case where a state has established permanent military government). Judicial reticence
is not necessarily unwise since the dimensions of the republican norm are uncertain. Wieck
quotes John Adams on the issue as follows: "Thus the word 'republican' may well not have
had any single and universal denotation to the men who inserted it into the guarantee
clause. It may, in fact, have had no meaning at all. John Adams complained late in life that
'the word republic as it is used, may signify anything, everything, or nothing.' He insisted
that he 'never understood' what the guarantee of republican government meant; 'and I be-
lieve no man ever did or ever will."' W. WIECK, supra note 91, at 13 (footnote omitted).
102. See, e.g., Cooper v. Gwinn, 298 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1981); In re Interrogatories
Propounded by the Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 308 (1975);
Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973).
It should be noted that tying the Guaranty Clause to the political question doctrine may
provide some judicial flexibility. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961), the Court noted:
"[ln the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other 'political question' cases, it is the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal government, and not
the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'"
Id at 210; see also Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion) (separation of
powers principle, like the political question doctrine, does not affect the federal judiciary's
relationship to the states). The legitimacy of state courts considering federal issues that are
not capable of being brought in federal court for justiciability reasons has never been satis-
factorily assessed. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 145-46 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as HART & WECHSLER]. A distinction could be drawn between the cases where the
application of the political question doctrine rests upon a "textual commitment" as opposed
to the absence of "manageable standards." In the former situation commitment of decision
making power to Congress or the Executive should operate to preclude both federal and
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The general tenor of both state and federal decisions addressing
the Guaranty Clause issue has been to give the clause a narrow read-
ing. In Kohler v. Tugwell,10 3 the question before the three-judge Louisi-
ana Federal District Court was whether a state constitutional ballot
proposition has been adopted in an unrepublican manner because it
was misleading. The court did hold that one of the fundamental rights
in a republican form of government is the right to vote on an amend-
ment to the state constitution.' 4 The court concluded, however, that
the proposition under consideration did not violate the Guaranty
Clause. 105 The district court reasoned that even though voters may
have had difficulties understanding the proposition, those difficulties
did not represent state abuse of governmental processes. 0 6
A recent decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court does raise
the possibility that the Guaranty Clause could play a more important
role in the future. In Cooper v. Gwinn,'°7 plaintiffs sought to compel
state prison officials to provide meaningful educational and rehabilita-
tion programs for female inmates of a state prison. The court intimated
that the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government
requires state governments to be subordinate to principles of justice,
morality, and fairness.108 It is difficult, however, to determine the ac-
tual significance of Cooper because the court intermixed its discussion
of the federal guaranty issue with its discussion of substantive guaran-
tees arising under the state constitution.10 9 Therefore, clarification is
necessary before Cooper can be viewed as a decision expanding the
protection afforded to state citizens under the Guaranty Clause.
state judicial intrusions upon that prerogative. See United States v. Curtis-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Federal concerns over the manageability of the case may raise
only prudential limitations that states are free to ignore. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 3-8 (1978), 14-15 (Supp. 1979) (political question issue consists of both a core
constitutional element and a nonconstitutional prudential component).
103. 292 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1968), aft'd393 U.S. 531 (1969).
104. Id at 985 (Wisdom, J., concurring). Cf. Hitson v. Baggett, 446 F. Supp. 674, 677
(M.D. Ala. 1978) (Johnson, C.J.): "Thus, consistent with the constitution, a state may pro-
vide for the selection of presidential electors 'through popular election. . . or as otherwise
might be directed.' The guaranty clause is not to the contrary. '[T]he distinguishing feature
of [the] form [of government guaranteed in Article IV, Section 4] is the right of the people to
choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue
of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies. By no stretch of the imagination
does Alabama's 'manner and system' of selecting its presidential electors violate these tenets
of government." (citations omitted).
105. 292 F. Supp. at 981-82.
106. Id
107. 298 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1981).




The Guaranty Clause might be used most effectively if it could be
linked with the "no impairment of essential government functions"
principle implicitly extended to ballot propositions by the California
Supreme Court in Brosnahan v. Brown.1 0 There is substantial histori-
cal support for the view that the Guaranty Clause was intended to in-
sure effective republican forms of government." 'I Thus voter-approved
constitutional ballot propositions that substantially impair or restrict
the ability of a state to perform integral governmental functions may be
subject to federal limitation. Just as the Tenth Amendment 112 protects
states against federal actions which impair state sovereignty, 113 so may
the Guaranty Clause protect the states against internal challenges to
that sovereignty. "14
110. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 258, 651 P.2d 274, 287, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 43 (1982). The "no impair-
ment" concept is discussed supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
111. W. WIEcK, supra note 91, at 42: "To the extent that the guarantee clause and its
section 4 companion, the domestic violence clause, were intended by their drafters to author-
ize repression of insurrections, they were parts of a contemporaneous process of delegitimiz-
ing the resort to violence by the people as an extralegal means of defending the community
interest when government failed to do so. In this aspect, the guarantee protected republican
government from the people."
112. U.S. CONsT. Amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
113. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). National League of Cities
has been so limited by later decisions that it is questionable whether it does anything more
than the Tenth Amendment it purports to invigorate. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
114. This Guaranty Clause protection could take on interesting forms in certain situa-
tions. See Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist., 459 F. Supp. 357
(D.Colo. 1978). There, the court granted a preliminary injunction that prohibited a school
district from spending funds to defeat an amendment to the Colorado Constitution. Id at
358. In granting the requested relief, the court relied upon the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, id at 360; however, it also considered the possible use of the
Guaranty Clause as an alternative ground for its decision: "The process of amending the
powers of representative government was a subject of discussion prior to the adoption of the
federal Constitution. In Federalist Paper No. 49, James Madison wrote: 'As the people are
the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter,
under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived, it seems
strictly consonant to the republican theory to recur to the same original authority... when-
ever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of government
.. ' When residents within a state seek to participate in this process by proposing an
amendment to the state constitution, the expenditure of public funds in opposition to that
effort violates a basic precept of this nation's democratic process. Indeed, it would seem so
contrary to the root philosophy of a republican form of government as might cause this
Court to resort to the guaranty clause in Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitu-
tion." Id at 361.
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2 Due Process Objections Based Upon Vagueness and Complexity of
Ballot Propositions
Ballot propositions qualified by petition are not drafted in a way
that inspires confidence in their care for and attentiveness to the
problems they address. Written in secret by those who share a common
view of societal problems, ballot propositions eschew compromise and
tend toward extremism with appalling frequency." 5
Ballot propositions are often lengthy and complex." 6 In addition,
voters rarely know beforehand the effect of an approved ballot initia-
tive on existing legislation. As one commentator has noted:
Because of the high costs of becoming informed, and be-
cause campaign advertising carries a low informational content, a
voter may not be aware that a particular initiative will, if passed,
adversely affect him. An initiative which may appear beneficial,
or only indirectly harmful, may in fact be directly adverse to par-
ticular voters. If those voters are unaware of this adverse effect,
they may vote against their own interests and lose the opportu-
nity to persuade others to their point of view. If the initiative
passes, those voters generally will be able to mitigate its adverse
impact only by bringing suit or by launching their own subse-
quent initiative. Both remedies are uncertain, time-consuming,
and expensive. 117
Finally, there is the fear that voter decisions on ballot propositions-
which often are so long and involved that they are incomprehensible to
the average person-will be based upon misleading campaign
115. See Comment, The Caifornia Initiative Process supra note 9, at 930-34.
116. Id at 934-37. The difficulties posed by a complex ballot proposition may be amelio-
rated by a well-drafted ballot title and summary. A well-reasoned comment on ballot titles
and summaries as an aid to voter comprehension is contained in Grose v. Firestone, 422
So.2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982): "Recently. . . we said that the purpose of [requiring a ballot
title and summary] is to assure that the electorate is advised of the meaning and ramifica-
tions of the amendment ...
"The requirement for proposed constitutional amendment ballots is the same as for all
ballots, that the voter should not be misled and that he have an opportunity to know and be
on notice as to the proposition on which he is to cast his vote. . . . All that the Constitution
requires or that the law compels or ought to compel is that the voter have notice of that
which he must decide.. . . Wat the law requires is that the ballot befair and advise the voter
sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot....
"Appellants effectually seek an exhaustive explanation reflecting their interpretation of
the amendment and its possible future effects. To satisfy their request would require a
lengthy history and analysis of the law of search and seizure and the exclusionary rule.
Inclusion of all possible effects, however, is not required in the ballot summary." (citations
omitted) (emphasis original). A defective summary may be grounds for invalidating an ini-
tiative. See Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1982).




There are, however, several difficulties associated with a due pro-
cess attack predicated on voidness due to incomprehensibility. First,
there is the problem of the absence of legal standards that are opera-
tionally relevant so as to enable courts to identify whether a ballot
proposition is incomprehensible due to complexity or vagueness. 119
How is comprehensibility to be measured? Does due process require.
that ballot propositions be drafted so that they can be understood by
the average person with a sixth grade education? Should a person with
a high school diploma be the standard? The divergence between voter
literacy and the clarity of ballot propositions is often marked:
A reading analysis by the Loyola University Reading Center
of three Los Angeles City propositions, . . . and 22 state pro-
positions (including nine initiatives) revealed that two ballot pro-
positions were written at the 1lth grade level, eight at the 13th
grade level, and 18 at the 16th grade level. It was estimated that
60-75 percent of the voters could not read and fully understand
the ballot measures as presented. . . . The reading experts ad-
118. An often recounted example of voter manipulation is described in A. SHAMISH & B.
THOMAS, THE SECRET Boss OF CALIFORNIA 37-38 (1971): "My next move was to place an
initiative proposal on the ballot to give the bus and truck industry... the right to pay 4 per
cent tax in lieu of any and all other taxes. We had a fight with that one.
I tried to educate the voting public on the need for standard taxation for buses, pointing
out that 1,700 small communities had no other public transportation besides buses. But the
railroads wanted to crush the competition of the bus lines, and they campaigned against the
initiative with propaganda and advertising. The measure was defeated by 70,000 votes.
Next time it was different.
I was going to beat the railroads at their own game. I convinced the bus owners to put
up enough money for a first-class campaign. I hired a well-known cartoonist named Johnny
Argens to draw a picture of a big, fat, ugly pig. Then I splashed that picture on billboards
throughout the state with the slogan:
DRIVE THE HOG FROM THE ROAD!
VOTE YES ON PROPOSITION NUMBER 2
I also had millions of handbills printed with the same picture and message. During the
last weeks of the campaign they were placed in automobiles in every city and town ...
The campaign worked. Boy, did it work! Nobody likes a roadhog, and the voters
flocked to the polls and passed the constitutional amendment by 700,000!...
All because the voters thought they were voting against roadhogs. That had nothing to
do with it."
119. Judicial response to statutory provisions that are imprecise or ill-defined has been to
give the provision a curative construction. See, e.g., ACLU v. Board of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d
203, 218, 379 P.2d 4, 13, 28 Cal. Rptr. 700, 709 (1963) (a statute otherwise uncertain "will be
upheld if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources");
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 948, 479 P.2d 669, 675, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 315 (1971) (if possible, enactments should be interpreted to uphold their validity).
These principles have been applied to ballot propositions. See, e.g., Associated Home Build-
ers, 18 Cal. 3d at 598-99, 557 P.2d at 482, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 50; Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45,
170 P.2d 411 (1946).
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vised the Committee that the average reading level of Los Ange-
les voters was only that of the eighth grade. 2 '
A second problem with a due process attack on ballot propositions
is that the charge could easily be seen as a patronizing view of popular
abilities--"sorry, you didn't know what you were doing; therefore, the
ballot initiative is invalid." To the contrary, judicial acceptance of bal-
lot propositions has been essentially unquestioning and laudatory of
the process. For example, Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme
Court, a fearless champion of civil rights and civil liberties, discussed
the use of ballot propositions as follows:
The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to
provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of the out-
standing achievements of the progressive movement of the early
1900's. Drafted in light of the theory that all power of govern-
ment ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of
the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people,
but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it "the duty of the
courts to jealously guard this right of the people," the courts have
described the initiative and referendum as articulating "one of
the most precious rights of our democratic process. . . . [Ilt has
long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to
this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not
improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in
favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it."' 2 '
Another problem would arise if this comprehensibility test were
adopted. One of the standard legal fictions under which our society
operates-that the people understand the laws which define legitimate
conduct in our society- might be called into question.' 2 2 The fiction
that the populace comprehends the law may be a shibboleth that our
legal system is unprepared and perhaps unable to disavow. Thus far,
the ballot proposition process has enjoyed a high degree of judicial ap-
proval. 23 As a result, courts may prefer not to approach the dark side
120. Comment, The Caiffornia Initiative Process, supra note 9, at 935 n.67.
121. Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 591, 557 P.2d at 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45
(citations omitted). This felicitous attitude toward constitutional amendments can be con-
trasted with the attitude of a bygone era which held that "it was heresy to suggest the possi-
bility of change in governments divinely established and ensured." C. MERRIAM, THE
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND THE UNWRITTEN ATTITUDE 6 (1931).
122. Cf. Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Bd., 91 Ohio St. 176, 180, 110 N.E. 485, 486
(1915) ('The polestar in the construction of the Constitutions ... is the intention of the
makers and adopters."). In the case of ballot constitutional propositions, the people are
either the makers or adopters, or both. The courts' use of voter intent to construe a ballot
proposition necessarily implies that courts believe voters initially understood the content of
the ballot proposition.
123. This, however, may be changing. Recent decisions by both the California Supreme
Court and the Florida Supreme Court have been adverse to initiative proponents. AFL,
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of democracy-errant majoritarianism-in the absence of a specific
content based norm against which the legitimacy of ballot propositions
may be determined.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Vested Rights" Theory
a. Ballot Propositions and Reduced Expectations of State
Constitutional Protection
A crucial issue that arises in the context of ballot propositions is
whether persons have a constitutionally protected right to continue to
receive the same, consistent level of protection of civil rights and civil
liberties once the right has been recognized by the state judiciary as
arising under the state constitution. Ballot propositions designed to
overrule or circumvent state constitutional jurisprudence are often per-
ceived to be directed against disfavored groups espousing unpopular
causes. Recently, ballot propositions have been used to contravene ex-
pansive definitions of state constitutional rights in the areas of race re-
lations" 4 and criminal justice.'2 5 Ballot propositions involving these
topics have been successful because the subject matter fuels voter inten-
sity.' 26 In other areas, state constitutional jurisprudence has remained
CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687 (1984) (initiative which would put state on record as supporting
amendment of federal Constitution to require balanced budget taken off ballot); Legislature
of the State of California v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781
(1983) (reapportionment initiative taken off ballot); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla.
1984) (Proposition 13 type initiative taken off ballot because it violates single subject limita-
tion). In Fine the court purported to distinguish the Florida measure from its California
counterpart. Id at 992. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board
of Education, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978), California's Proposi-
tion 13 was held not to violate California's single subject restriction.
124. At the state level, the emphasis has been upon school busing. See, e.g., Washington
Initiative 350, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 28A.26.010-900 (1981) (declared unconstitutional in
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)); California Proposition 1,
CAL. CONsT. art. § 7(a) (upheld in Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, (1982)). At
the local level, housing and zoning have been the focus of attention. See Sager, supra note
92.
125. See, e.g., People v. Aldana, 151 Cal. App. 3d 948, 954, 199 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (1984)
(Proposition 8 overruled People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441,492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972)
by allowing the unlimited use of prior criminal convictions in criminal proceedings). On
April 19, 1984 the California Supreme Court denied a hearing in Adana but ordered that
the court of appeal's decision not be published in the official reports. See CAL. R. CT. 976.
See also, ag., People v. Castro, 151 Cal. App. 3d 48, 55-56, 198 Cal. Rptr. 645, 650 (1984);
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972) (overruled by 1972 constitutional ballot proposition that reinstated death penalty
as permissible penal sanction under California Constitution (CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 27)).
126. Lowenstein, supra note 7. Professor Lowenstein's study indicates that the major
ballot proposition battles in California, evoking large campaign expenditures, have involved
economic matters (usury, taxes, utilities (nuclear power)) or social matters (no smoking
zones, environment). The outcomes of ballot propositions relating to civil rights and civil
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relatively free from popular interference. For instance, courts have ex-
panded state constitutional protections embodied in the right of pri-
vacy, 2 7 the rights of expression and association,1 28 separation of
church and state, 129 and access to public forums. 3  Indeed these rights
occasionally have received popular support at the polling place. 31
When ballot propositions are used to limit state constitutional ju-
risprudence, it could be argued that those propositions are invalid on
the ground that citizens have a federally guaranteed right to continued
protection under the previously granted rights or liberties. Anchoring
such a guarantee in the Constitution, however, proves difficult. One
possible theory is that existing state constitutional jurisprudence creates
"vested rights" secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under the "vested rights" theory, a court must determine
whether the rights at issue are private or public; only private rights re-
ceive constitutional protection. 132
liberties (see Proposition 18 (obscenity-1972 General Election), id at 618; Proposition 17
(death penalty-1972 General Election), id at 615; Proposition 9 (campaign financing and
disclosure-1974 Primary Election), id at 623; Proposition 7 (death penalty-1978 Primary
Election), id at 628; and Proposition 1 (school busing-1979 Special Election), id at 629)
probably were not determined by the amount of campaign spending; rather, those outcomes
were determined by voter iitensity, coupled with media attention.
127. See, e.g., City of SantaBarbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.3, 610 P.2d 436,
440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3 (1980) (questioning Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974)); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 772-77, 533 P.2d 222, 232-35, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 104-07 (1975) (restricting undercover police surveillance on university campus); Breese v.
Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 164-68 (Alaska 1972) (declaring invalid school hair length restriction).
See generally, Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
385 (1982).
128. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 117-19, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (1979) (punitive
damages for defamation inordinately chills free expression).
129. Compare Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 669-72 (Colo. 1983)
(cause of action stated for unconstitutional display of nativity scene), with Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (city's display of nativity scene not violative of First
Amendment).
130. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (rejecting Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976)). See also, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23
Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854. See generally Note, Private Abridgment of
Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L. J. 165 (1980).
131. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art 1, § 1, amended by initiative in 1972 to provide explicit
protection for privacy. See also Siraco, supra note 75, at 648 n.81: Despite the assumptions
these tests make about majoritarian voting, plebiscite results sometimes reflect pro-civil lib-
erties sentiments, decisions against middle class self-interest to the benefit of low income
groups, political liberalism, and the courage to take stands that corporate lobbies had dis-
uaded the legislature from taking. In some cases, voters' principled stands have put their
elected representatives to shame." (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923).
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In cases involving ballot propositions that limit state constitutional
jurisprudence, it is difficult to meet this "private right" requirement.
For example, assume citizens were to challenge a ballot proposition
that overturned a state court decision mandating busing to achieve
school desegregation. 3 ' Resolution of such a case under the "vested
rights" theory would depend upon whether the court holds that the
right to a desegregated education is a private 134 or public right. It
seems likely that a court would determine that a public right is in-
volved because of the larger social agenda implicated in desegregation
cases. 135 Thus, a challenge to such a ballot proposition based upon the
"vested rights" theory would be unsuccessful.
Putting aside the issue of its applicability, the "vested rights" the-
ory does not seem to provide an effective solution in the ballot proposi-
tion context. Discussing the problem in terms of "vested rights,"
"private rights," or "public rights" hardly advances the inquiry into the
constitutionality of a ballot proposition restricting a developed state
constitutional jurisprudence. The "vested rights" theory assumes that
once certain rights are judicially recognized, they become immune
from state legislative reevaluation. 36 Thus, if courts employed such a
133. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1976).
134. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 620, 635 (1950).
135. Courts have authority to implement and to oversee wide-ranging desegregation
plans. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (compensatory education programs
for victims of school desegregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (approving use of quotas, redistricting, and busing to achieve school desegre-
gation). It is difficult to fathom the private rights involved in such a dispute, particularly
where the recipients of the benefits often are not the "direct" victims of the wrongful con-
duct sought to be remedied. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976). See also Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Fore-
word- Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 4, 5 (1982).
136. See Hodges, 261 U.S. at 603; see also McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24
(1898): "[I]t is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been
once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate ac-
tions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment, the power of the legisla-
ture to disturb the rights created thereby ceases."
It may be, however, that the only "vested rights" are those that definitely can be moored
in the Constitution or in an articulation by the government. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
393 U.S. 268, 282 n.43 (1969). See generally Hodges, 261 U.S. at 603; Hospital Ass'n of New
York States, Inc. v. Toia, 577 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1978); De Rodulfa v. United States, 461
F.2d 1240, 1252 n.61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniea 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
Rather than focusing upon the "vested rights" theory, it might be more profitable to
address this problem in terms of the constitutional prohibition against state impairment of
contracts. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. When a judgment qualifies for protection under this
provision, it should be protected as a contract, not as a judgment. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel
Nelson v. Policy Jury of St. Martin's Parish, Ill U.S. 716 (1884) (if a cause of action is of
such a nature that a legislature could not impair it before judgment, it is equally protected
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theory in assessing ballot propositions, a doctrinal straightjacket would
be imposed upon the states. In addition, the theory would distort fed-
eral-state relations by giving federal courts ultimate control over revi-
sions of state law any time a person arguably affected by that revision
claimed a vested right.
b. Revising State Constitutional Jurisprudence Through Principled
Decisionmaking
Relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, several commentators have developed an alternative theory re-
lating to the effect of ballot propositions on state constitutional
jurisprudence. 137 If adopted, this theory would insulate state constitu-
tional jurisprudence from majoritarian revision but would not generate
the complications associated with the "vested rights" theory. Under
this alternative approach, only public institutions governed by process-
oriented decisionmaking could reappraise judicial decisions designed
to protect disfavored minorities. 138
If this view were accepted, electoral majorities generally would be
unable to use the initiative process to change state constitutional juris-
prudence. If, however, constitutional ballot propositions were initiated
by a process of principled decisionmaking, those ballot propositions
could be upheld. For example, if a particular ballot proposition were
initiated after a public hearing before the legislature or a law review
commission, the principled decisionmaking requirement might be met
even though the measure would become part of the state constitution
through popular approval.
Although the theory of "process-oriented decisionmaking" has a
nice intellectual ring, two recent cases, Washington v. Seattle School
Dist. No. ll9 and Crawford v. Board of Education,40 demonstrate that
the theory has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. In Seattle
after a judgment). Ajudgment is not, however, a contract entitled to the protection afforded
by the impairment clause of the Constitution. Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883); Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173 (1877). The interests of peace
and repose that are the foundations of the final judgment rule are not of constitutional di-
mension insofar as those interests independently guarantee the judgment against modifica-
tion by the sovereign that rendered it. Furthermore, federal doctrines against legislative
impairment of judgments, although of uncertain dimension, see HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 102, at 98-102, are based upon the principle of separation of powers and, as such, are
not constitutionally required of the states.
137. See, e.g., supra note 92; L. TRIBE, supra note 102, at 1137-46.
138. See, e.g., supra note 92.
139. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
140. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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School District, the Court reviewed a Washington ballot proposition
passed in response to a Seattle School Board desegregation plan.14 1 In
order to neutralize the plan's extensive use of mandatory busing, pupil
reassignments, and school pairing, 142 the ballot proposition prohibited
the assignment of pupils to schools outside of the student's neighbor-
hood. ' 43 The proposition did contain a number of exceptions and did
not purport to "prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from adju-
dicating constitutional issues relating to public schools.""
The Court found that the ballot proposition, when viewed in con-
junction with its exceptions, permitted busing in all contexts except
where necessary to achieve racial balance.' 45 Moreover, the ballot
proposition bifurcated governmental responsibility on the basis of ra-
cial considerations: those individuals seeking school desegregation
remedies were required to do so at the statewide level, while all other
forms of redress were available at the local level. Thus, for all practical
purposes, the ballot proposition extinguished any possibility for deseg-
regation. If upheld, the proposition would have resegregated the Seat-
tle school system in the face of and in response to the district's plan for
desegregation. Not surprisingly, the measure was declared
unconstitutional. 46
In Crawford, the Court reviewed a California ballot proposition
that limited the power of state courts to order busing to the standard
required by federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment.'47 The
Court upheld the ballot proposition because the initiative did not do
any more than require the California Constitution to assume the same
floor regarding mandatory school busing as that imposed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 41 In addition, unlike the Washington ballot prop-
osition in Seattle School District, the California measure did not
structure government decisionmaking on the basis of racial considera-
tions. 149 The California proposition merely withdrew a benefit that
had previously been conferred-the power of California courts to order
mandatory school busing to alleviate racial discrimination caused by
141. The ballot proposition passed with almost 66% of the statewide vote. Seattle School
Dirt., 458 U.S. at 463.
142. Id at 461-62.
143. Id at 462.
144. Id at 463.
145. Id at 474-75.
146. Id at 487.
147. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 529.
148. Id at 542.
149. Id at 536 n.12.
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de facto racial segregation.' 50
The Crawford decision is significant in that it reveals the Court's
unwillingness to look behind a ballot proposition's incantations of race
neutral objectives to ascertain whether the measure has a hidden
agenda.151 In Crawford, the Court eschewed such an inquiry by placing
particular reliance on the state appellate court's finding that the ballot
proposition was not enacted with a discriminatory intent.'52
It is unclear whether deference to lower court fact finding in this
area is based on normal vertical institutional concerns associated with
appellate review of lower court decisions153 or on the horizontal institu-
tional concerns commonly described as federalism,'54 or on both. On
the one hand, such deference could be the product of common, institu-
tional reluctance to engage in sustained fact finding inquiry at the ap-
pellate level-a policy not itself surprising,"-' although some discussion
by the Court as to why the constitutional fact doctrine was not applied
would have been proper.'56 If this explanation is correct, the validity
150. Id at 540. The Supreme Court's decisions in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) and Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), indicate that the
mere existence of segregated schools does not evidence prohibited racial discrimination. For
courts to mandate busing, the existence of segregated schools must be the result of intention-
ally discriminatory acts.
151. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 543-45.
152. Id The Court's pronouncement that the California ballot proposition was not the
product of racial animus is difficult to square with reality. See Comment, California Anti-
Busing Amendment: A Perspective on the Now Unequal Protection Clause, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. Rav. 611, 665-81 (1980). Petitioners in Crawford filled 75 pages of the Clerk's Tran-
script with newspaper clippings evidencing that the proposition was specifically designed to
maintain segregated schools. See Reply Brief for Respondents Crawford et al at 24 n. 11,
Crawford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1981). The interme-
diate court found that racial animus did not motivate California voters in proposing and
enacting the proposition. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 654-55, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. That finding,
however, was unsupported. By pretending that racial animus was not a substantial factor in
Crawford the Court avoided a very difficult inquiry into how racial animus and the demo-
cratic process can be reconciled.
153. The weight given by the Supreme Court to state court findings of fact is incredibly
diverse. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 102, at 590-95, 601-10. Deference is
called for but is subject to ad hoc rejection or avoidance.
154. Federalism may be viewed as a normative concept that attempts to prescribe the
proper scope of power exercisable by the national government, the states, or both. A mean-
ingful formula, however, has not been devised. Federalism seems to constitute the proper,
though indefinable, equilibrium between the centripedal tendencies of the national govern-
ment and the centrifugal tendencies of the states. At its root, federalism is a balance of
power concept. See Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
155. Cf. Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635 (1966) (Court cannot review
concurrent findings of fact by courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional
showing of error).
156. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) ("The duty of the Court is to make
its own independent examination of the record when federal constitutional violations are
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of ballot propositions withdrawing state-created remedies may be influ-
enced significantly by the fact finding process and the tribunal selected
to adjudicate the dispute.'57
On the other hand, the Crawford decision suggests that federalism
concerns play a role in the Court's reluctance to look beyond state
court fact finding. In Crawford, the Court relied on its earlier decision
in Reitman v. Mulkey 5 ' and in observing that:
[a state court is] "armed. . .with the knowledge of the facts and
circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact" of
the Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that prop-
osition would operate . ..." Similarly, in this case, again in-
volving the circumstances of passage and the potential impact of
a Proposition adopted at a statewide election, we see no reason to
differ with the conclusions of the state appellate court.' 59
It may be making too much of this language to suggest that facially
neutral ballot propositions enjoy a safe harbor from federal inquiry
into voter motivation. The fact that both Crawford and Reitman came
to the Supreme Court from state courts may be coincidental. Never-
theless, litigation involving the constitutionality of ballot propositions
alleged is clear, resting as it does on our solemn responsibility for maintaining the Constitu-
tion inviolate."); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964); f. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984) (federal district judge's factual findings that the
New York Times v. Sullivan standards have been met in a libel action must be reviewed de
novo).
157. For this reason, plaintiffs may prefer to litigate in federal court but find that forum
effectively foreclosed. The decision to bring a pre-election challenge to the proposed ballot
proposition ordinarily will commit litigants to state court for the duration. Questions in-
volving formal compliance with state requirements for proposition qualification do not raise
issues of federal significance. Nor is it likely that a federal court would retain pendent juris-
diction over such questions were those issues attached to a federal question. See United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). The relative insubstantiality of the
federal claim may also counsel dismissal of pendent state claims. See McFaddin Express,
Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1965). Even if the federal claim is substantial, a
dismissal or stay of the federal proceeding may be in order, since state electoral practices
represent the type of sensitive state social policies that probably call for abstention. See
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978); see also Badham v. Eu, 568 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (federal court properly abstained in challenge to state reapportionment controversy
between Democrats and Republicans where state court determinations would materially al-
ter the nature of the federal constitutional question); see generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4244 (1978). Finally, efforts to compel
state officials to follow state law may be effectively foreclosed from being brought in federal
court by the recent decision in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 52 U.S.L.W.
4155, 4159 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1984) (when a federal court instructs state officials on how to
conform their conduct to state law, such instruction conflicts directly with the principles of
federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment).
158. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
159. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 543-44 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378
(1967)).
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invariably will be conducted in state court rather than federal court
because the federal judiciary prefers to yield to state courts on such
issues.' 60 Thus, the practical effect of Crawford will be to relegate to
state courts the politically disagreeable task of factually impugning
voter motivation.16 1
The Court in Crawford passed when given the opportunity to ex-
pressly approve or disapprove of the "process-oriented decisionmak-
ing" thesis. 162Instead, the focus of the opinion was upon the question of
whether the ballot proposition imposed a race-specific burden upon mi-
norities. 161 The Court did, however, suggest indirectly that reappraisal
of state constitutional jurisprudence is not limited to forums that base
their decision upon the principled decisionmaking concept.)64
160. See supra note 157.
161. The nature of the factual inquiry is unclear. In the somewhat analogous situation of
exclusionary zoning, the Court has identified six factors to be considered in determining
whether discriminatory purpose fueled a particular course of conduct:
(1) the discriminatory impact of the official action;
(2) the historical background of the decision;
(3) the "specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision";
(4) departures from the "normal procedural sequence";
(5) departures from normal substantive criteria; and
(6) the legislative or administrative history of the decision.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
Although several of those factors are not directly applicable to the ballot proposition pro-
cess, they only need slight modification. For example, campaign advertising and polling
could be substituted for legislative or administrative history. Nevertheless, the relative
openness of the electoral process, the difficulty in demonstrating cause and effect relation-
ships, and the absence of a decisionmaking "record" would seriously hamper efforts of
plaintiffs to show "discriminatory purpose" in the ballot proposition context.
162. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
163. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537-44.
164. In this regard, the Court stated: "[We reject] the contention that once a State
chooses to do 'more' than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. We
reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive of a State's democratic
processes and of its ability to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the decisions
of this Court." Id at 535. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan,
also appeared reluctant to embrace the theory that constitutional revision which has an im-
pact on racial minorities can be evaluated only by political bodies employing principled
decisionmaking: "[R]uling for petitioners on a Hunter theory seemingly would mean that
statutory affirmative-action or anti-discrimination programs never could be repealed, for a
repeal of the enactment would mean that enforcement authority previously lodged in the
state courts was being removed by another political entity. . . . I cannot conclude that the
repeal of a state-created right-or, analogously, the removal of the judiciary's ability to en-
force that right--'curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities."' (citations omitted). Id at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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11. The Effect of Ballot Propositions Upon State
Constitutional Jurisprudence
From the above analysis, it appears that the ability of voters to
effect changes in state constitutional jurisprudence is not subject to
meaningful, noncontent-based constitutional limitations. As such, bal-
lot propositions can affect not only the vitality of state constitutional
jurisprudence, but also the chartacter of decisionmaking in areas of
shared federal-state interest and competence. This situation, however,
does not lead to the conclusion that state constitutional jurisprudence is
the prisoner of majoritarianism. State common law decisionmaking
has always been subject to supervision by state legislatures; 65 yet, the
prospect of legislative revision of judicial precedents has not seriously
threatened the continuing vitality of the common law process.1 66 Thus,
the potential for majoritarianism will not necessarily generate effective,
across-the-board action by popular majorities.
A. The Limited Horizons of Majoritarianism
The success of ballot propositions that reflect majoritarian senti-
ments antagonistic toward state constitutional jurisprudence rarely de-
pends upon large campaign budgets; rather their enactment depends
upon a high degree of voter intensity. 67 Consequently, in order for
165. Pound, Common Law & Legislation, 21 HARv. L. Rav. 383 (1908). As a general
rule, if it acts in pursuit of legitimate state ends, a legislature may abolish common law rights
without implicating individual constitutional guarantees. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En-
vironmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978); Morris v. Hotel Riviera, Inc.,
704 F.2d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
166. Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND To-
MORROW 11-40 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959); see also Traynor, The Limits afJudicial Creativity, 63
IOWA L. Rv. 1 (1977).
167. Large campaign budgets are used to mobilize an apathetic public to support a par-
ticular measure. Because an apathetic voter is likely to be uninformed on the proposed
measure, such large campaign budgets operate to inform (or misinform-see supra note
118), and persuade the voter in order to secure a favorable vote at the polls. See generally
Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 544-47. The type of ballot proposition addressed here generally
does not result in significant one-sided spending. See supra note 126. Although the differ-
ence between the pro and con positions on a particular ballot proposition may be considera-
ble, the total amount spent on these ballot propositions tends to be small when compared
with that spent on other ballot propositions. For example, the budgets for Proposition I,
California's 1979 School Busing Initiative, were $363,746 (proponents) and $43,248 (oppo-
nents). Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 629. Professor Lowenstein notes that: "The victory of
Proposition 1 was not caused by the one-sided spending in its favor. The amount spent by
supporters, while more than eight times what the opponents were able to spend, was not
particularly large, and the campaign provoked little public attention. Opposition to school
busing was so widespread that campaigning in favor of Proposition 1 was likely to prove
superfluous. An antibusing initiative seven years earlier had been approved by a 63%-37%
margin, and a survey early in the campaign period showed 78% opposed to busing, with 18%
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such ballot propositions to be approved, generally they must exhibit
two characteristics. First, the subject matter of the ballot proposition
must address a matter of current popular concern. Good litmus tests
here are the standard polls on voter concerns. Issues that do not appear
relatively high in the polls are unlikely to generate sufficient voter in-
tensity to carry the measure to election victory. Absent substantial
campaign spending, it can be expected that only a small range of issues
will be able to generate sustained voter interest. The second character-
istic is related to the first: where there are significant factional interests
associated with the issue or issues addressed by a ballot proposition, the
level of factional intensity must strongly favor the majority faction for
ballot propositions to succeed.
Recent experience with ballot propositions shows that the presence
of these two characteristics is a prerequisite to election victory. State
constitutional jurisprudence has met with consistent majoritarian rejec-
tion where that jurisprudence involved increased rights for criminal de-
fendants'16 8 -hardly a group for which there is much popular
sympathy. Crime is an issue that usually ranks high in polls on voter
concerns.1 69 Moreover, measures to restrict rights of criminal defend-
ants generally do not affect any significant political faction; indeed, it is
only when a neutrally phrased "anti-crime" ballot proposition could
affect a significant voter faction that any doubt arises about the likeli-
hood that the measure will be passed. For example, ballot propositions
designed to impose heavier penal sanctions for criminal activity or to
permit more liberal investigative activity by law enforcement officials
commonly pass by solid majorities.170 On the other hand, "anti-crime"
measures that involve the expenditure of tax dollars face much stiffer
challenges because such propositions are opposed by taxpaying voter
in favor and 4% with no opinion. Not surprisingly, Proposition 1 won easily, by 69%-31%."
Id (footnotes omitted).
168. See supra note 125.
169. See, e.g., Field California Poll, Release No. 1195, Oct. 20, 1982 (76% of voters rate
issues of crime and law enforcement as highly important).
170. California Ballot Proposition 17 (reinstatement of death penalty) was approved by
68% of the voters at the 1972 General Election. Secretary of State, Statement of Vote 30
(General Election, November 7, 1972). In the November 1982 General Election, Florida
voters approved two ballot propositions initiated in the Florida Legislature. Proposition 2,
which passed by a 63.4% margin, modified FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12 to conform the Florida
search and seizure standard to the federal standard. Proposition 3, which passed by a 60.6%
majority, permits denial of bail if the judge believes the accused poses a threat to public
safety. FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 14; Florida Tabulator of Official Votes for General Election,
Nov. 1982, at 27.
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factions. 171
The school busing propositions do not disprove this thesis. Al-
though there undoubtedly is a sizable degree of racial animosity associ-
ated with anti-busing initiatives,1 2  those initiatives cannot be
categorized as purely majority-minority conflicts. In fact, there is some
evidence that a significant number of minority citizens disapprove of
involuntary busing. 173
In general, state constitutional jurisprudence outside of the crimi-
nal justice area has not been affected by majoritarianism. State court
decisions expanding the rights of privacy, association, and religion, for
example, have escaped popular reaction.1 74 The explanation for this
phenomenon appears to be that these decisions (1) generally comport
with popular views; 175 (2) address issues of reduced popular concern;176
171. For example, California Ballot Proposition I (authorizing bond indebtedness for
prison construction) was approved by 56.1% of the voters at the 1982 Primary Election.
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote 43 (Primary Election June 1982); California Ballot
Proposition 8 (commonly known as "Victim's Bill of Rights") was approved by 56.4% of the
voters at the 1982 Primary Election. Id at 45. Both of these margins of approval are sub-
stantially less than those received by the Death Penalty and Search and Seizure Initiatives.
See supra note 170. These figures suggest that groups opposing constitutional ballot proposi-
tions should stress fiscal impact wherever possible.
172. There is a tradition of using ballot propositions to frustrate integregation in Ameri-
can society. See L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-
1860, 1869-72 (1961) (describing efforts by voters to prevent black immigration into the
states). In the 1950's, several state attempts were made to countermand the mandate of
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) through the ballot process. See, e.g., Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), a t'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied 354 U.S. 921 (1957) (declaring invalid Louisiana constitutional amend-
ment making segregation lawful); Wettach, North Carolina School Legislation-1956, 35
N.C.L. REv. 1, 3 (1956) (amendment of North Carolina Constitution to allow for placement
of pupils in order to frustrate Brown . Board of Educ.). In 1954, Mississippi voters author-
ized the legislature to abolish public schools at the statewide level and school districts to do
the same at the local level Miss. CoNsT. art. 8, § 213-B. The constitutionality of § 213-B
has not been addressed by the courts.
In the 1960's, attention turned toward Fair Housing Laws. See, e.g., Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a 1964 California ballot proposition
that prohibited the state from interfering with private discrimination).
173. This fact has been acknowledged by the courts. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545. What
little survey research has been done on the subject also has tended to confirm this point.
See, e.g., Field, Caif/ornia Poll, Release No. 1031 (June 14, 1979) (Hispanics oppose
mandatory busing by 3:1 majority; Blacks evenly split on issue). The Field Poll did ac-
knowledge that the size of the entire sample group was not sufficient to provide a high level
of statistical confidence in the findings.
174. See supra notes 86-90.
175. See, e.g., supra notes 89, 131.
176. See, e.g., Development, supra note 1, at 1465-72, 1478-82 (economic regulation). See
also Fox v. Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (enjoining
on state constitutional grounds, illumination of large cross on Los Angeles City Hall during
Christmas season).
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or (3) often tend, albeit indirectly, to reduce public expenditures.1 77
State constitutional jurisprudence in areas besides criminal justice
also has escaped majoritarian reaction in recent years because litigation
to achieve institutional reform, which has a direct and visible budget-
ary impact, largely has been brought in federal courts.1 78 Thus, state
constitutional jurisprudence in these areas avoided the taxpayer revolt
of the late 1970's. If state courts increase their use of state constitutions
to effect structural institutional reform that results in direct and visible
impact upon public treasuries, majoritarian correction by ballot pro-
positions might become more common. At present, however,
majoritarian reaction is largely limited to state constitutional jurispru-
dence involving the rights of criminal defendants.
B. Boomerang Effects
Ballot propositions do not always accomplish their stated pur-
poses. First, problems in draftsmanship can produce unintended conse-
quences in ballot propositions. 79 In addition, it must not be forgotten
that successful ballot propositions become part of the state constitution
and ultimately are subject to state court construction and interpreta-
tion. This judicial scrutiny can alter the results achieved by ballot
propositions.
An example of the role courts play in this area can be seen in City
and County of San Francisco v. Farrell.80 In Farrell, the California
Supreme Court examined the Jarvis-Gann Initiative (Proposition 13)
passed by the voters in 1978. The initiative was designed to reduce
taxes by providing:
Cities, Counties and Special Districts, by a two-thirds vote of
the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on
such district, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a trans-
action tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such
City, County or Special District.'
In intrepreting this provision of the initiative, the California
Supreme Court held that the term "special taxes" applied to taxes
177. See, e.g., Mandel v. Hodes, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 615-17, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 256-57
(1976) (holding that governor's executive order permitting state employees to take three
hours off with pay on Good Friday violated state constitution).
178. See Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1115-16 (1977) (observ-
ing that civil liberties lawyers believe that civil liberties litigants will fare better in federal
court than in state court). Cf. Chayes, TheRole of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra
note 135 (discussing the increase in federal judicial involvement in public controversies).
179. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
180. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1983).
181. California Ballot Proposition 13, § 4 (1978); CAL. CONST. art. XIII.
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"earmarked for specific purposes."'182 Consequently, only a limited
class of taxes required approval by a two-thirds vote; taxes deposited in
accounts for general funds were free of the supermajority requirement.
By giving the term "special taxes" a narrow interpretation, the court
sharply reduced the effectiveness of the requirement that taxes be ap-
proved by a two-thirds voter majority prior to enactment. 83
Another representative case in this area is People v. Superior Court
(Engert).184 This case involved a due process vagueness challenge to a
penal code provision that permitted the imposition of the death penalty
where the jury made a special finding that the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious, and cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."'8 5 In
striking down the provision, the California Supreme Court held that a
1972 ballot proposition' 86-which set aside a state court decision in
People v. Anderson 87 that had invalidated the death penalty under Cal-
ifornia's constitutional prohibition against "cruel or unusual punish-
ment"-was not controlling.' 8 The court found that the ballot
proposition dictated only that the death penalty did not violate the state
constitution per se:
Section 27 itself does not compel the interpretation sought by the
People; it states simply that "such punishment"-i.e., death-
shall not be deemed to contravene state constitutional provisions.
Our determination that the special circumstance here in question
is void for vagueness is in no way premised on the fact that death
is one of the two punishments that may result from its applica-
tion. The thrust of our decision is that no person should face the
potential loss either of liberty or life based on statutory language
so vague that the person's fate is left to the vagaries of individual
judges or individual jurors. Inasmuch as section 27 is directed,
by its terms, to insulation of "the death penalty provided for
under those [reinstated] statutes" (italics added), it does not, on
182. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 53-54, 648 P.2d at 937, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
183. See also Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643
P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982) (holding that § 4 of the Jarvis-Gann Initiative prohibit-
ing "special districts" from raising taxes without the approval of two-thirds of the qualified
electors, see supra text accompanying note 181, applied only to entities empowered by state
law to levy a property tax; all other "districts" were exempt from the limitation).
184. 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982).
185. Id at 801, 647 P.2d at 77, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
186. The relevant text of the ballot proposition was worded as follows: "The death pen-
alty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the inflic-
tion of cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of Article I, Section 6, nor shall
such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision of this
constitution." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 27.
187. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
188. Engert, 31 Cal. 3d at 807-09, 647 P.2d at 81-82, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
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its face, preclude review on state due process grounds.18 9
The Engert decision constitutes another example of a ballot propo-
sition being construed narrowly by a state judiciary. The California
court determined that the scope of the ballot proposition was limited to
the cancellation of a particular state court case-People v. Anderson.
The court could have given the ballot proposition another reasonable
construction-that the initiative was designed to restore completely the
death penalty in California to the extent authorized under the federal
Constitution. The court did not pursue that alternative; thus, Engert
suggests that ballot propositions cancelling decisions based upon state
constitutional jurisprudence will receive rigorous judicial scrutiny.
C. The Sebastiani Reapportionment Decision
The recent decision by the California Supreme Court in Legisla-
ture of the State of California v. Deukmejian (Sebastiani)19° confirms
that state courts will resist strenuously any majoritarian efforts to limit
state constitutional jurisprudence. Although the Sebastiani initiative
was not a constitutional ballot proposition,19' the decision is instructive
concerning the attitude of the judiciary toward efforts to restructure
political institutions in a manner that might affect state constitutional
jurisprudence.
Sebastiani involved a statutory initiative that would have given
voters the opportunity to adopt a reapportionment plan different from
the plan previously approved by the legislature. 92 The Sebastiani ini-
189. 31 Cal. 3d at 807, 647 P.2d at 81, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
190. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). The decision is often referred
to as the Sebastiani decision because Don Sebastiani, a member of the California legislature,
sponsored the initiative and was one of the real parties in interest in the proceedings.
191. Under California law, the initiative may be used to propose either statutes or
amendments to the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. II § 8: "(a) The initiative is the
power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt
or reject them.
"(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a
petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution and
is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of a
statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all
candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election."
192. The initiative, if adopted, would have realigned the Assembly, Senate and Congres-
sional districts of California and repealed statutes enacted by the Legislature during the
1983-84 First Extraordinary Session. A.B. 2, 1983-84 1st Extraordinary Sess., ch. 6, § 2, ch.
8, § 2, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 34, 120 (West). Specifically, it would have repealed and re-
placed chapters 1 through 4 of division 18 of the Elections Code, encompassing sections
30,000 through 30,030. Both the Sebastiani initiative and the plan adopted by the legislature
were based upon the 1980 federal census.
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tiative generated substantial political controversy in California; 193 con-
trol of the California legislature for the remainder of the 1980's
possibly could have turned upon the outcome of the initiative. 194
The court in Sebastian4 with only one justice dissenting, 195 struck
the initiative from the ballot.' 96 The court found that the initiative vio-
lated the once-a-decade rule, which prohibits more than one redistrict-
ing per federal census.'97 The court, however, chose not to decide
whether the use of an initiative is a constitutionally permissible method
of redistricting.198
Sebastiani contains several analytical deficiencies. First, the court
took too great a leap when it jumped from a constitutional provision
mandating a legislative reapportionment to a conclusion that there can
be only one reapportionment per census. 199 Second, the court's coyness
regarding whether an initiative can ever be used to implement legisla-
tive redistricting is both undesirable and unproductive.2 °°
The California Constitution does not contain an express prohibi-
tion against multiple redistricting during one census period.20 ' Rather,
the prohibition was recognized in California by way of dicta in the
1907 case of Wheeler v. Herbert.2°2 Based upon this dicta, the court in
Sebastiani found that at the time California first adopted the initiative
process in 1911,203 "the once-a-decade rule had already been clearly
193. Political controversy between parties appears to be the norm whenever reapportion-
ment is addressed. See L. HARDY, A. HESLOP & S. ANDERSON, REAPPORTIONMENT POLI-
TIcS: THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES (1981).
194. The Sebastiani plan appeared to favor Republicans, while the plan adopted by the
legislature seemed to favor the Democrats. Perhaps, this point could be put more precisely:
the legislature's plan was thought to favor incumbents, of which the substantial majority
were Democrats.
195. The court's opinion was per curiam. Justice Richardson, the anointed conservative
on the court at the time, see Barnett, The Supreme Court of California, 1981-82-Foreword"
he Emerging Court, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1134, 1173-74 (1983), dissented.
196. Governor Deukmejian had called a special election for Dec. 13, 1983 to submit the
initiative to the voters. 34 Cal. 3d at 664; 669 P.2d at 19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 783. The petition-
ers in Sebastianisought a court order prohibiting the Governor and other state officials from
expending any public funds or otherwise acting with regard to the special election. Id The
only matter set for the special election was the initiative.
197. Id at 663, 669 P.2d at 18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
198. Id at 673, 679, 669 P.2d at 26, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790, 794.
199. 34 Cal. 3d at 669-73, 669 P.2d at 23-25, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 787-89.
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
201. See 34 Cal. 3d at 668, 669 P.2d at 22, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
202. 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907). Wheeler involved a legislative change of county lines
after the decenial redistricting. Since the boundary change did not alter the existing legisla-
tive districts-a point acknowledged in Sebastiani4 34 Cal. 3d at 669, 669 P.2d at 22-23, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 786-87--the statements regarding once-a-decade redistricting were pure dicta.
203. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (now CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8).
FaU 19831 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
established." 2 4 The court concluded that the once-a-decade rule pro-
hibited use of the initiative because the electorate either did not con-
sider the use of the initiative to redistrict or did not evidence an intent
to exclude such use, if permissible, from the once-a-decade rule when it
adopted the initiative process in 1911.1°0
A close examination of the court's conclusions regarding the once-
a-decade rule and the 1911 adoption of the initiative process can illus-
trate problems with the court's determinations. Silence in 1911 about
whether the initiative process could be used to redistrict does not sup-
port the across-the-board, once-a-decade gloss placed on the redistrict-
ing provision in Sebastiani. In 1911, the once-a-decade principle had
not been recognized other than by way of the dicta in Wheeler. Thus,
unless dicta is considered the law for purposes of ascertaining electo-
rate intent,20 6 the electorate's silence in 1911 regarding the once-a-dec-
ade principle is hardly significant, much less decisive. The court's
reliance on the 1911 adoption of the initiative process as support for its
decision to strike the redistricting initiative from the ballot seems
misplaced.
There are other analytic weaknesses with the holding in Sebastiani
regarding the once-a-decade rule, including the court's unexplained
failure to apply standard rules of constitutional construction. The
court failed to apply the plain meaning rule, which precludes courts
from examining the policy behind a constitutional provision when the
language is clear.20 7 Instead, the court considered the policy behind the
prohibition against more than one legislative redistricting per census
and applied it to an effort by thepeople through the initiative to effect a
204. 34 Cal. 3d at 676, 669 P.2d at 27, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
205. Id
206. No California court has adopted this rule of construction. If the court in Sebastiani
intended to do so, it should have discussed the point more thoroughly because the adoption
of such a rule would represent a significant development in the field of constitutional inter-
pretation.
There is a rule of construction in California that the failure of the legislature to alter
statutory language when the subject is before it indicates an intention that the law remain
unchanged except for the alteration being made. Kirby v. ABC Appeals Bd. 47 Cal. App. 3d
874, 877, 121 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1975). This rule has been applied to the state constitution.
People v. Mims, 136 Cal. App. 2d 828, 831, 289 P.2d 539 (1955) ("Where a provision of the
earlier Constitution had been construed by the Supreme Court it must be presumed that the
framers of the present Constitution in readopting it intended it to have the same effect").
207. See 5 B. WrrKin, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 68 (8th ed.




Another weakness in the court's conclusions about the once-a-dec-
ade principle can be seen in its attempt to "harmonize" the legislative
redistricting and initiative provisions of the California Constitution." 9
The analysis on this point seems somewhat superficial. Having first
determined that the initiative power was coextensive with the legisla-
tive power, 10 the court simply held:
Well-established principles, applicable both to statutes and con-
stitutional provisions, including constitutional provisions added
by initiative, as was former section 1 of article IV, require that in
the absence of irreconcilable conflict among their various parts,
they must be harmonized and construed to give effect to allparts.
There being no contrary intent apparent and no repugnancy be-
tween former article IV, section 6, the predecessor of article XXI
as heretofore interpreted, and article II, section 8, we conclude
that the initiative process may not be used to do that which the
Legislature may not do, to redraw legislative and congressional
districts during the decade following a federal decennial census
at a time when the Legislature has enacted a valid and effective
statute or statutes defining those districts.21
Although both the Legislature and the people had equal power to re-
district, the court held that the power itself could only be exercised
once a decade. Thus, the power to redistrict went to the swifter.
If the above quotation is examined closely, it supports a result dif-
ferent from the one reached in Sebastiani. In particular, the court's
effort to "harmonize" the various constitutional provisions was incom-
plete since little value was placed on the constitutional authorization
for the initiative process.212 Application of the "well-established prin-
ciples" referred to by the court, indicates not only that the people have
the power to redistrict, but that such a power is not affected by the
exercise of an equal power by the legislature. This alternate interpreta-
tion would have resulted in a more harmonious reading of the two con-
stitutional provisions than that reached by the court because it would
208. 34 Cal. 3d at 673-74, 669 P.2d at 25-26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90. Both CAL. CONST.
art. XXI and the once-a-decade rule from the Wheeler dicta apply only to redistricting by
the legislature.
209. See 34 Cal3d at 676, 669 P.2d at 27-28, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92.
210. Id at 673-74, 669 P.2d at 26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
211. Id at 676, 669 P.2d at 27-28, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The provisions of the state constitution referred to in the quote involve the require-
ment of Legislative reapportionment.
212. See supra note 191 for the text of the California constitutional provisions for
initiatives.
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have "give[n] effect to all parts."'2 13
The other significant deficiency in the Sebastiani decision involves
the court's suggestion that there may be a substantive limitation on the
use of the initiative process to effect redistricting. The court mentioned
the point twice in its opinion,2 14 the second time clearly conveying the
message that the use of the initiative process in this context is in some
doubt.215 If the court has determined that the initiative power to redis-
trict is coequal to the legislative power-and thus subject to the same
once-a-decade limitation-the court's equivocation is mysterious. It
suggests Orwellian notions of equality: the initiative power is equal to
legislative power when that equation will reduce the effectiveness of the
initiative process itself; the initiative is never more equal or equal when
it counts. Since the court's actual holding made unnecessary any com-
ment about the power to redistrict by initiative, the matter should have
been left open by a neutral exception or should have been discussed
specifically. Instead, the court's opinion "teases" the bar and public
about a possible new doctrine, and is simply unproductive.
Sebastiani will have an impact upon future judicial evaluation of
initiatives designed to limit state constitutional jurisprudence. The
Sebastiani decision contained no ringing endorsements of the initiative
process. This fact may evidence a growing awareness by courts that
beneath the facade of participatory democracy, there is the potential
for abuse of the political process. Initiatives ought to be evaluated on
the basis of what they do and how they do it; they should not be evalu-
ated against a fantasized image of citizen democracy.
The willingness of the court in Sebastianito consider a pre-election
challenge216 also may signal a greater sensitivity to the latent constitu-
tional infirmities in initiative proposals. Delay may be proper under an
213. 34 Cal. 3d at 676, 669 P.2d at 27-28, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92. The court in Sebas-
tian however, avoided this alternate interpretation by first determining that the initiative
power and the legislative power were identical; with this "merger" completed, the court then
addressed the "harmonization" issue. This analysis is unconvincing because the court never
explained its reasons for merging the two powers before applying the relevant principles of
construction. Such single-mindedness surely will provide fuel for those individuals who
contend that "result counts for too much and reason for too little" for current members of
the California Supreme Court. Barnett, supra note 195, at 1192.
214. 34 Cal. 3d at 673, 679, 669 P.2d at 26, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790, 794.
215. Id at 679, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794: "First, assuming that the initiative
is generally available in the redistricting process notwithstanding the command of article
XXI that '/i]he Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines' (emphasis added) ...." The
court also suggested that legislative redistricting is not insulated from popular supervision.
Id This statement indicates that redistricting by initiative is proper. Nevertheless, the
court's language in the above quotation undermines such a conclusion.
216. See 34 Cal. 3d at 665-67, 669 P.2d at 20-21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
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idealized view of the initiative. Judicial recognition of abuse to the
political process by use of the initiative may result in a greater number
of pre-election challenges of initiatives in the courts.
Most importantly, the Sebastiani decisions may direct courts away
from the tradition of interpreting the boundaries of the initiative pro-
cess liberally. After Sebastiani courts may scrutinize ballot proposi-
tions more closely where those propositions could have a substantial
and readily ascertainable effect on existing constitutional policies. If
the people wish to continue to incur "self-inflicted wounds" through
the use of the initiative, they will have to strictly comply with the rules
of the initiative process.
Conclusion
Ballot propositions compel everyone involved in the formulation
of a living constitutional jurisprudence to consider the function and
role of state supreme courts in a democratic society. Courts increas-
ingly are called upon to establish social agendas. The function of set-
ting a social agenda is not itself a recent phenomenon; however, courts
seem to approach this task much more intensely today than in the
past.217
Judicial activism does not exist in a vacuum; courts today act in a
setting in which majoritarianism enjoys increased attention and accept-
ance.2 18  The ascendency of majoritarianism has been facilitated by
technological innovation, 2 19 and has occurred during a period of in-
creased special interest use of the political process. 220
217. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institution Litiga-
tion, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465, 467, 510 (1980).
218. A movement from a "representative democracy" to a "participatory democracy"
has been noted by trend analysts. See, e.g., J. NAISBTT, MEGATRENDS (Warner Books ed.
1984).
219. Several factors support this assertion. First, use of professional signature-gatherers
probably aids in the qualification of ballot propositions. See Caiffornia Assembiy Elections
and-Reapportionment Committee, Public Hearings on the Initiative Process 13 (Oct. 10, 1972).
Second, infusion of funds from statewide or national political action committees likely influ-
ences the electorate's decision in voting on ballot propositions. See Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (striking down limitations upon ballot
measure contributions); see generally Nicholson, The Constitutionality of Contribution Limi-
tations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683 (1981). Professor Lowenstein's
recent study, which indicates that campaign spending is not necessarily determinative of the
success of a ballot proposition is inapposite. Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 511. Lowenstein
did find a strong correlation between negative spending and voter rejection. Id at 544. On
the other hand, Lowenstein found neither that affirmative spending is ineffective nor that
social disutility results from one-sided affirmative spending. Id at 542-43.
220. This increase in special interest use of the political process is evidenced by the
proliferation of Political Action Committees (PACS). PAC is a popular acronym used to
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Courts are aware of the institutional constraints under which they
must operate; 221  Yet, courts must be careful not to become mere
weathervanes of popular attitudes. In the main, the judiciary responds
to this antimony by exercising circumspection and restraint.222 There
is, of course, the possibility of excess. Judicial decisions in a particular
area of state constitutional jurisprudence may exceed the existing con-
sensus; this sometimes will generate popular dissatisfaction. That this
dissatisfaction may be acknowledged and addressed either internally
by a state supreme court through doctrinal reformulation or popularly
by ballot proposition should hardly cause one to question the underly-
ing vitality of the judicial process. Indeed, the far greater danger, albeit
an unlikely one, is that courts may so consistently adopt ideological
positions contrary to the existing consensus that institutional legitimacy
is questioned.
Ballot propositions provide information to judges regarding the
public's view of judicial decisions. Similarly, ballot propositions en-
able courts to determine how well they are persuading and educating
the public. Thus, it is not surprising that courts generally speak favora-
bly about ballot propositions.223 Nevertheless, the judiciary must im-
pose constraints upon the ballot proposition process in order to deter
practices that might distort voters' signals. Are the voters aroused?
How do they feel about the matter? Has the matter been clearly
presented to the voters so that courts may see a true relationship be-
tween the ballot proposition and the election results? At present, courts
restrict their inquiry to questions of this type when considering general
attacks upon the ballot proposition.
There is, however, another fundamental concern here. Successful
ballot propositions become law and can displace existing state constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Individuals with stakes in that jurisprudence
stand to lose protection if a particular ballot proposition is enacted.
define all political committees that have not been authorized by candidates or political par-
ties. Between Jan. 1, 1981 and Oct. 13, 1982, PAC contributions to all political candidates
and election measures amounted to $163.3 million. Of that amount, approximately $89.1
million was spent at the state and local level. 9 FEC RECORD 6 (Feb. 1983).
221. See generally, Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOwA L. REv. 1 (1977).
222. All to often, critics measure the "activism" of a court solely by the final judgment
reached. Such critics frequently ignore the failure of public institutions to take action re-
quired by law or by standards of elementary human decency. See Johnson, The Role ofthe
Judiciary With Respect to the Other Branches of Government, I 1 GA. L. REv. 455, 472-74
(1977) (Sibley Lecture by Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. discussing the reasons for his exten-
sive remedial decree over the Alabama mental hosiptal system).
223. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, the question becomes whether the stakeholders' claim to
protection is more important than the public's ability to change the law.
Although those protected by existing state constitutional jurispru-
dence have no state constitutional right to continued protection, a bal-
lot proposition limiting state constitutional jurisprudence is invalid if it
violates a specific federal guarantee.224 However, a ballot proposition
of this type is not open to federal constitutional challenge where it does
not violate a specific federal guarantee. This approach is eminently
sensible. Judicial unwillingness to allow constitutional reformulation
through ballot propositions could result in potentially volatile suppres-
sion of popular dissatisfaction.
Increased judicial involvement in public disputes necessaruly re-
sults in greater public scrutiny of the judiciary. The practice of judicial
review is not perfect. Ballot propositions can serve as a form of dam-
age control, thereby preventing more severe attacks upon the courts
that might result if popular displeasure is not ventilated.225 It is dan-
gerous to assume that such displeasure would be limited to state judi-
ciaries; the disease probably would prove contagious and perhaps fatal.
Still, courts must be prepared to control individuals or groups attempt-
ing to use ballot propositions improperly. Neither the legislature nor
the people can short-circuit the federal Constitution or state
constitutions.
224. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
225. At least one respected commentator has noted that the very legitimacy of judicial
review in a democratic society rests in large part upon the continuing power of the electorate
to amend the constitution in order to reverse judicial decisions involving constitutional adju-
dications. Rostow, T7he Democratic Character ofJudicialRepiew, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193, 197
(1952).
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